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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Amcmg the many and diverse factors which caused the Revolution of
May 26, 1810, In the

port city of Buenoa Aires none stand out so promtnently as

the econom1c. The roots of the confUct were deeply embedded In the forces at work
on both sides of the Atlant:lc during the colonial perled; on the

ODe

side was the

economic defensive po11oy of the mother country, on the other t the economic surrival of Buenos Aires. In order to underatand the genesis of revolutionary attltudes,
it wW first be neceaaary to enter into a short hlstor1cal review of the trade of Bueno

Aires and of the pollcy and regulations of SpaIn.
In a direct economic sense colonies were valuable to SpaID as sources

of raw materials and of reveDue. The producta of the IDd1es had high commercial
value to a Europe which was beginning to 1nd:uatrlallze. but of this value Spain wu
not the ultimate beneficiary, s1nce she remained backward In manufacturing. To
the COUlltrleS of northern Europe. thoroughly committed to private capltal1st1c enterprise. the benefits of the wealth of the Indies eveDtully flowed, either through the

normal channel. of trade or through their plunderIDg expeditions. As the theory of
mercantt1tsm came to dominate the atateoraft of Europe, SpaID was thrust into
mercantUlsttc competition with her European rivals. MercanUllsm became a means
of building up a natlon's power for polltical purposes and of mald.ng it stronger than

2

its neighbors; but Spain was a poor nation, sparsely populated, and backward In
manufacturing as compared with her rivals. SJnce she was unable to supply her

own domesttc requtremeuts; obviously she could not meet all the requirements of
her colonies. Besides, the merchants of SevUle and C&dtz, who w.re the principal
benefto1ar1es of Spain's imperial system, did not encourage an abundant flow of
manufactures to America because they preferred a regime of acarolty and high
pr1oes. By means of heavlly convoyed voyages Spain sought to keep all trade with
her colonies in her own haDds and from it she r1g1dly excluded all foreign ves..ls.
Spanish economic poliey from first to last was preocoupled with the product1on and
acqw.ttion of bullion. and with the maintenance of an exclusive monopoly.
Of all the Spanish oolonies none wu Ie•• adapted to the commeroial

polioies whloh formed the basis of the Spanish colonial system than Buenos Aires.
Founded in 1680 after the already established imperial trade routes. poor in mineral
resources, 1nslgn1ftoant as a .ource of revenue. Bueno. Aire. was of little interest

to SpaiD; but at the same time owing to its atrateglo geographloal position, it posed
a constant threat to the integrity of Spain's colon1al polley. From the very begjnntng
Bueno. Aire. was made to _rve as little beyond a oonvenient highway to ChUe and
gold-bearing Peru. Retained as an Inferior colony. she was kept at the beck and
call of the western and northern viceroyalties.
Bueno. Aires had dlfflculty in estahltMing commercial contact be-

cause of the law of 1561, whleh prohibited all overseas commerce through ports

8

other than those expressly designated for the purpose. It was not only imperative
for the survival of Buenos Aires that Spain reroute official trade going into Peru.
but interests of the interior had for some time recommended the southern approach
to Peru in place of the lengthy, cumbersome. and dangerous Panama route. The
products that came from Spain by the routes laid down in accordance with the monopol1st1c regime did not satisfy consumer needs. The new city was not only an available port. but its vast plains were adaptable to the breeding of llvestock, which laid
the foundaUon of a new wealth that permttted the exportaUon of wool, lard. and

hides. Moreover. the prinCipal adYantageof Buenos .A~ lay in its greater proximity to Spain.
As a beachhead on the plain. and as an AtlaDUc port from Peru,
Bueno. Aires attracted the attention of Spain. Although Spain rejected the southern-

route propo.als. she recognized the importance of the suggested route as a potenUal
gap in her economic defense through which smuggler. could undermine the trade
monopoly and draw off the wealth of

Potost.

III effect. her poUcy of economic de-

fense was closely linked to the problem of the economic survival of the bonaerense;
who, cognizant of their importance to the defense of the viceroyalty of Peru, demanded concessions from Spain.
True, l!!rml'2! were granted from Ume to Ume, but these unwittingly played into the hands of smugglers and faUed to satisfy either Spain or the
immediate needs of the POrt. The contraband trade carried on with the Portuguese.

BriUah. Dutch, and French e.eeded legal commerce 1D value and hurt the veated

Interests of the merchaata of SevWeBDd Lima.

Therefore, th1a R!rmiIo trade .... temporarily checked b.Y the protesting mercluulta of Peru and the re.ultant cidgla of 1601 whlch prohibited the trade

of the port of Bueuoa Alru.

1

In 1602 the eever1t7 of the earl1er

c!cIvIa \Yaa modl-

fled to allow Buenos Atrea to export flour. meat aDd tallow valued at about 11,600

pe808. III uoh8ap for cloGdq, abou. Ironware and other aeceaalUes.

2

Th1a

arrampJl18llt wu extended for a stmuar period ID 1608 ad for five more years In

ex1sttag law. forbade commerce With Peru b.Y way of Buenos Alre. and that trade

in the port of Bueaos AIrel jeopardized the proepertty of the pJ'Ov1Dces of Tierra

Ftrme. 3
1
ttReal

c8du1a de 8 de abrll de 1801.

Ind1a8 (Burmol Aires, 1901). I, 116.
2

If

:PoD,._ dfl

Arohl!O

tit

'"
''.Real cedula
de. de agoato de 1801," .ll'dsL.. p. 12'1.

3

Mem9rial del procurador general de 1u provine... del J!to de la
Plata, doD Mipluel Fr1a8. It Cort!fP2Pde!ela de If CIP4fd • Bqfggf Airel COD los
reyes de Esp6a, ed. Roberto LevW1er (Madrid. 1918). m. 66-77.

6

After the official Brazilian trade was suspended in 1622, Buenos
Aires was llmited to a yearly traffic with Spain by a regi!tro . . lieenaed trade of
two ships, but smugglers

soon. found ways to continue their activity. Since very

few licensed 8hips appeared at Buenos Aires between 1618 and 1676, it was the

yvtos de 8lTib!da.

ahlps that could legally enter a port UDder conditions of d1st:ress.

that kept the port of Buenos Aires open to trade. '!be ~ teclmique had numerous posslbWUes. but aboye all it proY1ded an oppo:rt1lD1ty for 8h1ps

to frequent

Buenos Aires.

The prohlbW.0n8 by which Spain tried to eDforce the economic isola-

tion of Bueno. Aires were revoked lD the ftrst half of the eighteenth century. The

Mventeenth and eighteenth centuries throughout Europe were marked by profound
changeslD atUtude. Lockets ideas began to develop; BOWl_au and MoDtesquieu
cried out aplnat the European :ruUng qsteml and Adam Smith and the physiocrata

attncted attenUon. At the close of the seventeenth century the InsIlD8 Charles U of
8pa1n died. wWlDg his ldngdom to the Duke of Anjou and· b:rlDgiDg on the war of the

Spanish Succession. France poured all its power into the coDf11ct, and succeeded

in setWng the war In its

own favor. 'Thus the era of the Bourbons began lD Spa1D.

Enlightened amd progressive, the Bourbons had us1m1lated some

of the Dew' econo-

mic and admiD1etrat1ve prtaclples of the age. The early Bourbons lD an attempt

to

improve commun1c&Uona with the colonies and to increase trade aboUahed the fleet'
system In 1740 and by piecemeal decrees aimed

at el1m1naUDg the :restraints on

6

trade.
By 1759 it was evident that the early trade reforms did not solve the

Spanish coloDial problems because through Buenos AIres had developed one of the
most exteulve contraband trades in America. Two factors made this possible:

first. by the treaty of Utrecht in 1713, England ohtatMd the Hie!to de gm,. the
slave trafflc right. and natu.raUy auoh III entering wedge into Buenos AIres pre..
aeDted untold opporlun1tles for the 1Dtroduct1on of goods, second, .by the same treaq t

/
SpaD18h offlo1al recognftlon was given to the Portuguese contraband O\1lpost of
Colonia del

sacramento conveniently located Just across the river ,from Buenos Aires
This WIS the situation that confronted Charles m at his ecce88ion to

the throae in 1769. In addiUoa. three factors persuaded him to take aot1on: the

lnfluence of economic theoriata. fear of. Brlttah compet1UoJl. and pressure from
France. statesmen motivated with the desire to ra18e the economic level of Spain
gathered artIIIld him: the Conde de FlorldablaDCa. the Marques de Campomanes.
the CoDde de Aranda. and Jovellanos. Up to th1a point. reform had been merely an

abrogation of the put; now more poalUve act10n began. In 17M D1ne Span1sh ports
were opened to colonlll trade; in 1787 four mI11 sh1p8 a year were llcelUled to sall

to Buenos Aires. Nine years later the crown created the viceroyalty of La Plata
and put Buenos Aires on a par with Lima. In 1788 BueDDS Aires could trade with
the interior and at long last goods could pISS from Buenos Aires

Peru.

to Chtleand to

7

These reforms were meant to strengthen and reaffirm the bonds
between the colonies and the mother country. but the results were jUBt the contrary.
Factors in Buenos Atres working toward revolution received new 8trength from the
Bourbon reforms. We must refer to the creation of the new viceroyalty of La Plata
and its resultant e\fect: the organization of an economic and political region that

tended to be orientated toward Buenos Aire8. The irreconcUabWty of the crown's
centralizing policy with Buenos Aires' requirements made SpaiD·scontrol increa8Ingly iDeffectiye. The system of 1ntendancies set up in 1782 as a means of strengtb-

en1ng royal authority was used by the oolonists to reinforce localism. The intendant
was made the spokesman for local interests and local aspirations. It may also be
asserted that the same result was produced by the free-trade reform. During the
period when oommerce wu UDder control of the neet, there was economic UDity;
now that the enUre empire was opened up to a commerce in whioh she could partake,
Buenos Aires could acquire a oertain eoonomio autonomy. lngenieros emphasizes
this point:
La creao(on del Vinewto del Rio de la Plata sellala
el momento or{ttoo de nueatra evolucton oolonial; en
ve1nte aDOI se producen tranaformaotones mas substaDoiales que en 101 dol 8lg1oa precedentes. La
hegemoma peruana e8 suplantada por la rloplaten.se;
Buenos Aires deja de ser la puerta falsa del Alto Peru
y tiende a oonvertirse en metropOli natural de las
Provincias Unidas del nuevo virreinato. EI cambio de
intereses coincide oon un cambio de e8piritu: la l1bertad
de comercio trae oona1go una oreclente l1beralidad en
las ideas; todo pensamiento de reforma y de progreso

8

encuentra una resonancia 0 una simpada, cada vez
menos tfmida; y cuando la torpeza 0 la mediocridad
de los virreyes que suoedieron a VerUz hizo peear
mas fuertemente la coyunda peninsular, fu8 naciendo
en todos los riop1atenaes cierto espiritu de autonomismo
liberal, que en alFos llegO a converUrse en de~o de
iDdependencla politica cwmdo la oportuntdad Ie lue
propiola. 4
The. commercial progress of Buenos Aires was marked by the foundation of the customs house In 1778 and the consul.do In 1794. After the creation of
the viceroyalty the introduction of merchandise Into the districts to the east of the
cordillera was effected more easUy and rapidly by wq of Buenos Aires than through
Callao. The shipments on mule back which had to cross the very high and difficult

mountain ridges of Peru In order to supply these regions with overseas goods. were
",.

replaced by way of Buenos Aires, so that even Potosi, Chuquisaca. and Santa Cruz,
as well as all the towns around them. fUled their shops with goods introduced from
Buenos Aires.

The Bourbon reforms contributed to a sudden increase In population
and prosperity In the new capital. Buenos Aires, which In 1744 had slightly more
than ten thousand inhabitants. reached a population of forty thousand at the end of
the century. The average annual export of hidell from Buenos Aires increased from
150,000 In the 1750's to 700,000 In the 1790's.
4

Jose lngemeros,La Evolucion de las Ideas ArgenUnas (Buenos

Aires, 1961). I, 68.

9

Econom1cally the towns In the interior witnessed a notable, energetic
growth of farming and ranching; but Buenos Aires' progress was reflected In much
more modest terms there, sharpening the cUvision between the Interior's small
local Industries and crop product1on and the cOut's commercial and livestock
economy. Although Charles m liberalized the mercantilist system, he cUd not open
the port of Buenoa Aires to international trade; therefore, not unt1l after the Revolution of May were the effects qt such a cUvided economy really felt: "one region
seeldng to import its oonsumer goods from abroad in exchange f~r its agricultural
products, the other demandiDglnternal markets for the output of ita 1nduatrI.es and
farms."s
In the lut decade of the eighteenth century it soon became evident
that what Buenos AIres needed ahoye all was direct contact with WGT'ld markets.
The necessity of trade through Sp8bl seemed unreasonable and unrealistic sinoe not
Spain but England was the greatest C01l8wner of the colony's produce. This abnormal

situation became more evident; for even under the tree-trade reform, contraband
continued to be extremely profitable to both native merohants and foreigners.
Had it been posslble to .confiDe the problem to its econom1c aspects
alone, the solution might have been possible without diarupting the po1!tlcal unity of
the empire. In reality, however t the social and political aspects of the struggle for
S

James R. Scobie, A!I!nt1na: A City and a Nation (New York, 1964).
pp. 61-62.

10
free trade were inseparable from the economic ones. First, the opening of the
port of Buenos Aires to all commerce meant the abolition of the outer ring which
held the imperial economy together. SecODd, it was a direct threat to the economic
and social security of those who had already occupied a privUeged position with

respect to overseas trade. Consequently, what the

~ocates

of free trade at first

conceived as a mere· change of ecoaomic poltoy, was gradually tranaformed into the
problem of economic autonomy, and from thls 1t would be a short step to the problem

of political independence. 6
This thesis deals with the role of a cosmopolitan Buenos Aires which

sldrted the effects of the Hapaburg. and Bourbons of Spain to keep it within the
overall pattern of the mercantUe policy and emerged as a center where commerce
aDd profits were the decisive elements that led to revolution. Economic studies

show that eyen

Spain'. imperial policy contributed to what Belgrano considered the

advantages accruing to the Plata from the cooperation between merchant. and landowners that resulted In the free-trade struggle; rather than the U81Ial close association-of merchant and craft guilds that predomtnated elsewhere In Latin America. It,

too. will account for the cleavage with the cities of the interior which was not healed
until the late nineteenth century.

6

Miron Burgin, 11le Economic
(Cambridge. 1946),. pp. 12-13.

MP!cts of Argentine

Federalism

11
Although in all Latin America Industrial activity had been reatricted

at first. in the seventeenth oentury it developed as a consequence of the failure of
Spain's industry and also because of the slowness of communication. Unl1ke the
1notp1ent manufactur1ng movements in Mex1co. Peru, and elsewhere, few industries

uofolded in La Plata. The l.lDen ad woolen 1nduatr1es of Corriemea, Catamarca, and

cOrdoba were soon ruined by the active commerc1al1nterohange which began in 1778,
and the infant iDduatr1ea disappeared oo~leteJy after the British invasions. 7
The htstory of the guUda in Buenos Aires followed a aiDiller pattern.
There were few arUaans in Buenos Aires before 1810. As early as 1606, the

es:uerdof reveal a concern for acimittmg foreign artisans becauee they were deaperately needed.
The tailora of Buenos Airea were the first artisans to establ1ah a
guild and succeeded in having their charter approved in 1783. 8 The firat formal
attempt to charter guUda in La Plata was lnlttated by a promulgation of Viceroy
Veritz in 1780 to estabUah gutlds for all classes of artisans, but the plan faUed to
materialize. When the s1lversm1ths appUed for a oharter in 1797, Ju1t1m de Leiva

7
Ricardo Levene. Lecoiones de I. HlNria Argpttpa (Buenos Aires,

1937), pp. 272-273.
8

See: Acuerdos del !fiJMuido cab1lsiq de Buenoa Aires (Buenos Airea,
1928), Serte n. Tomo VI. Llbroa XXI, xm, y XXIII, aBOS 1729 a 1733, pp. 713,
714, 718, 720, 726. 727 Y 739.
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refused because of the abuses of the porteno sUversm1ths. Finally. after a atorID¥
struggle with the shoemakers of Buenos Aires. Cornelio Saavedra, as syndic of the
cabUdo refused to register any goUda. Thus ended the attempts at gulld organization
which had been frustrated from the

start in La Plata.

The Revolution of Mq 25, 1810,

'91" a revolution for a free port; the

leader of independence was not a soldier. said Alberdl. but an economlat, Dr.
Moreno. Trade had been a precious term In BueJlO8 AIres 81nce the very beginning
of ita h1story . . a Spanish posse88ion. Under the 1mpaot of contraband dealings,
the arbitrary measures of Spabl, and lDfluences from Europe, there was developing
in Buenos Aires. by a prooeas of el1mtDation and aelecUon. a sense of independence
which was to manUeat Itllelf when the Geeaa10n demanded.

CHAPTER

n

CREOLE ACTIVITIES

'I1le movemeDt for badepeadeace ba aa.08 Alre. made little
noticeable propoe•• watll the J.ut decade of the elpteeath ceatury when there wu
behlnd the practtca1 eooraomlc problem. a

bocI¥ of oplDloa ad thouPt formlag the

lDteUectual-ecGl101Dlc backgroand of the Reyolut1aa of Ma116. 1810. IDto W.
movem.t of bateUeotaal prepan.t1aa for emaaolpatloa strode the eCOllOlDlst
MamIe! BelIfUO.

A wealthy creole from the merollat clau ba aa.08 Aire•• BellHDo
became batereated ba eooaomlo. aad pol1t1oal act. . . while at the Ualventt,. of
Salm8lloa ba 1'188. When tile first new. of the French ReYOlutlOll reached Spaba.

he was

,ettiD, hi.

law dell'- at VaUadoltd. He .... actlft ba

~mlc

Oinle. at

Madrid ba 1'193 when he recelYed hi. appobabDeat u aeoretar;r of the 00IlAlad0 of

Bueaoa Airee from the mlalater Garcloqal. 1
Oa hie retara to

aaeaoa Alre. Be1Jl'8ll0 expoaded the Idea. of

European ..thor. from whom hie eclectic aature had derived lupirattoo. Throu&h
Campomanea' Edacaolo. pop!!lar. he peaetratecl the th_gIlt of the

Spatah eoODO-

,.

mlata, Moocada. Martbae. de Matta. Osorio, aad Ward. who had criticized Spaba'a
lMamael Bellrlllo, ttAatoblosra«a." DoowDento. del Archlvo de
BelF!!O (Baea08 Alre., 1918), I. 1'1'1.
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ancient economic and colonial policy. Campomanes besides, directly inspired
Belgrano with a desire to eatabUsh economic aociet1es to debate aDd look for a
solution to the economic problems of the time, aDd also to erect schools to instruct
and train people to carry on the task for economic betterment. 2
BelgraDO's economic ideas were not ODly gleaned from the Spanish
writers. One can prove that his theories, and even their verbal expression, were
derived from the encyclopedtsts and physioorats, espeCially Adam Smith. He very
pointedly explained Smith's doctrine on value, prices, money, capital, and land
as they were applicable to the problems of Buenos Aires. 3
The immediate causes of the RevOlution of May, oame into play when
the CODsulado at Buenos Aires, pushed along the path 01. progress by Belgrano, took
an active part in publlc affairs. The OOD8lIlado was set up for a twofold purpose:
first, it had jurisdiction over trade; second, it had the character of an economiC
junta, \\hose main purpose was to promote agriculture, industry, and trade. The

first session met on JUDe 2, 1794, and In his autobiography Belgrano recorded his
impression of the members:
• • • 90 pueclo deoir bastante mi sorpresa cuando
conooi a los h'!.mbres nombrados per el Rey de la
Junta, que habia de tratar de agrlcu1tura, Induatria
2 Manue1 Belgrano, Escritos economicos (Buenos Aires, 195"),
pp. 121-127.

3

Ibid •• pp. 114-120.
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y comerelo, y propender a 1a felicldad de las proviDci...
que compoa.{aa el vlrrelDato de BueD.Os Aires; totlos erBD
comerclantes eSpaDoles; exceptu.ando uno que otrot aada
sablan mas que 8U comerclo mCDopolista, a saber. comprar por outro para vender por echo CCD toda 8egurldad;
para comprobaate de sus conoclmleatos y de sus ideas
liberales a favor del pals, como su esplrttu de mOllopolio4
para no perder el camino que tellla de enriqueoerse . • •
If great was Belgruo's cynioism _riIlg the first meetlag of the

CCIlsulado. greater would be his dlsUlusiomneat fa the next session between the

monopolist merchl.1lts ad those merohu.ts eagapd ill the slave trade. Royal
decrees of 1784 and 1791 permitted the traffio of Negroes to Buenos Aires aad
granted to foreiga ships the privilege of exportiJlg the frates del pals on their retum voyage, a compet1tiCD which alarmed the mCDopolists. SiIlce hides were the

.

most valuable prodllct for export, they dld aot want them cooldered frutos del pais.
Of course. as Belgrano says, the monopolists declared by a great majority that

"los cueros

110

eran fratoa. ,,5
The dlsappolntment Belgruo felt fa havillg Bueaos Aires lagglag

behlad fa economio reforms had BD outlet In the publication of his first economic
work fa 1786. Priaclpios de la Clencla EOOll6mico-PoUUca. trlllsiateel from the
French, played a vital part fa Buenos Aires Waldag aad won Belgraao loyal

4

..
Belgraao. "Autobiografla. It p. 177.

5

Ibid., p. 178.

16

followers. 6 However, it was Artiole xxx: of the cedu.la for the erectioD of the
consulado that gave him an opportuDity to express the ideu that would agitate the
creole mind. It defined the duty of the secretary of the CODsulado "escribir cada

aDo una memoria sobre 101 obJetos propios de su instituto. ,,7
Belgruo's yearly memorials preached lelf-study for the three
brlllches of commerce, agriculture, and industry, aad in the light of that selfexamination, the making of future p181ls. Each paints a picture of the Deeds of the
people, seeks the root of the clUficulties, and gives the remedies that reason recommends. Among Belgrano's published writlDgs the first three memorial. deserve
most attentiOll. These are the distilled es.ence of European thOllpt applied to the
solution of the problems of Buenos Aires.
The day came wheD Belgra.Do had a chanee to outilDe publicly his
eeonomlc ambitions for Buenos Aires. In the cOll8ulado s.ssioa of July 15, 1796,
he read his first

M.mori~

"Medios geaerale. de formentar 1& agrIcultura, ammar

..

la lDdustrla, proteger al comercio en un pall agrlcultor." The tellOr of hil arguments was falDtly remiJdscent of Campomanes. He polDted out that it was a common practice for govenaments to aid the 8COllOmy, SpaiD being no exceptioa, for
"Pocos soa lu ciudades y vlllu de nuestra Pea.1nsula que ao teagID. una sociedad
6

Belgrano, Escritos. p. 24.

7"CHula de la creaci6n del caosulado, " Revlata de la Blblioteca
Nacional (Buenos Aires, 1941), V. 14-15.
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economic&, cu.yo instituto es mirar por la agrtcu.ltura y artes, premlaaclo a cuantos
~

se deatinan con apUcacion a cu.alquiera de eetas ramas. . ."

8

The subject of Belgraao's Memoria in 1'l97, was the restoration of
the linen and flax Industry which he prophesied would eventually become one of the
most valuable for the country, especially if the king would cCllltiDue favorable legls~

latlOll: "como son la real cedula de comercio de aegros, la real orden 80bre el
comerel. con las COlOllias extraftJeras 1 particu.larmente 1& que declara esta misma
para que se hap COIl el BrasU; la real orden della libertad de dereobos a las

hartnas, la que concede para que teagan buques propios . • ,," 9
The cOllSUlaclo was gradually becoming a battlep-ound between the
cODfilct1ag interest. of the creole haceadado. SIld the Spaaiah merchants, 80
Belgrano read his third Memoria 011 JUlle 14, 1'198, ia III effort to effect a reunion
between the merchlllt gaUd and the hac_cIacIos, whose gulld he had admitted to the

consulado. because his eeoaomic studtes had shown him that the arreataess and
power of his nattve laac:l would depend 011 agrleultare. He advanced the need for a
great expansion of educatlOll to study the CIL1l8es that produce wealth, increase in.
commerce, SIld progress. Notln.g that Eallaad was the first to form lOoieties to
deal with agriculture, the arts, and commerce, followed by Italy, Switzerland,

8Ibid., p. 66.

-

9Ibid ., p. 96.
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Germany, Sweden, and others; and that Spatn had many economic societies working
and studying industriously for the improvement of the economy, he advocated their
erection in Buenos Aires. 10
In a later day, what he said in these memorials would come to have

a vltal part in the revolutionary thinldag of Btaeaoa Aires. but in those years. they
were the means of galntng for him a coterie of supporters in the ooasulado. all
young men of the cal1ber of Cervlio, a famous creole teacher &ad englDeer, and
Castelli, the renowned creole lawyer.
The royal order of March 4, 1795. whim authorized trade between
Bueaos Aires and foreign colonies, 11 ended tn a continuous struale 1n the
coanlado which Dot oaly ref1eetl the eCOllOmic Ufe of the eopooh, but puts in relief
the growtag aatagoaism, the first dissOD8llee amODg tile Spmiah ad creoles in
Buenos Aires ia which persoaalit1es ataad oat.
The powerful Spanish monopollsts headed by Alzap., Anchorena,
Santa. Coloma, Aliiero, Vi1l8llueva, 8Ild members of the recistreros, wholesale

merchants who were really intermecHary apDts of Cadiz, tried to have the freetrade reform of 1795 abol1shed. 12 They were not only subjected to stormy sessions
10Ibid., pp. 104-110.
l1nCMula de" de marzo de 1795," Documentos para la Historia
Argentina (Buenos Atres. 1916), VII, 89.
12Bartolome Mitre, Histori. de Belgrano y de 1& Independenci a
Argentina (Buenos Atres, 1947), I. 135.
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with Belgrano but had to Usten to the ftery tnsinuations and soUd convictions of
Escalacta. a member of the consul ado and an admirer of Belgrano, who read the
,
"Representacion del conctliaro don Francisco Antoaio Escalada," whioh stressed
the necessity of maintalning in all their vigor the royal decrees that permitted
free trade on a trial buis. He oOlldemned the Spanish commercial interests in
...

Cadiz, Lima, and Havaaa. and all merchant pides that tried to retain privileges
of commercial exclusiveness. The most Belgrano-l1ke part of his argument was

the assertion that the problems of Buenos Aires were caused by lack of freedom
and, therefore, the promotion of free trade must be the end and only aim of the
sovereign. 13

In 1'19'1, in response to an appeal from Bueaos Aires, a royal order
was issued which permitted trade in neutral vess.ls but OIlly OD conditfoll that they

.

should return to the porta of Spain and pay the .usual duties.

14

As Spain at the time

was virtually blockaded by Englad. the Dew rep1atf.01l8 were impracticable. There

followed a great scarcity of forellD maaufactures, ad the value of exports from
BIlellOs Aires, whlcth had &mouatecl to 5 1/2 milUoll pesos in 1'196, fell to 335, 000
pesos lD 1'19'1. Because of this the oabUdo urgeDtty demanded permission to carry
13

Ibid. t pp. 132-135

l" fl C8ctula de 18 de noviembre de 179'1 ttl DHA, W

t

89.

.

I
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on trade With neutral vessels without restriction and to export native products to
any country that wanted them.
This appeal was advanoed in the consulado by Juan Gonzales de
Volanos, who pointed out that the viceroy, confrOllted with the restrictions of the
royal order to the free commerce of neutral vesaela. was at a dlaadvantage. He
clef_ded the viewpoint of Anlel Izquierdo, the administrator of customs to allow
the viceroy to adopt measures to fit the ciroumatanoes tn Buenos Aires in order
to re-establish commerce. agriculture, and iaduatry .15
It WOIIld be a serious error to think of BeIIl"IDO and his followers as
being satisfied with legislattve solutions aloae to the problems of Buenos Aires.

One of his maia projects was an award system for work and study to promote
economic progress. The formula which the consulado accepted ia 1798 would
award:
1.
proveohoao.

COD.

Al labrador • . . hioiese coutar haber iatroducldo un eultivo
arreglo el c11ma y cirCU.D.staae1aa de la provincia. . . y hap

ver en una Memoria las veataju que traerfa at eomere1o ia partIcular de su pals
y general de la aaotOa. se Ie uiparla c1D.cueata pes••
2.

Al individuo •.• coastar haber eatableciclo una huerta y monte

15 nActa del 3 de noviembre de 1798," Archtvo General de la Naci~n:

Conaulado de Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires. 1947).

m.

293-301.
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.-

de arboles utiles ell el puerto de la ensenada de Barragin . . . cillouellta pesos .
.-

3. GQue medio se podria adoptar para hacer grandes plantactolles
de arboles utUes ell la jurisdtcctoll de esta capital sill Ilecesidad de poner cercos ?
.-

.-

AI mismo tiempo, cIlpnse las tltiltdades que reswtartan . . . clncuenta pesos.
4.

Al que manifeste el modo de teller aquas permaaentes en la

campana • . . cillcueDta pesos.
5. GComo podr8.n preservarse los ou.eros de la polilla? .
qutntentos pesos por ahora, al que

COIl

la expert_cia maatfestare las ventajas

• una pensloa. de qulnt_tos pesos al aDo por el discurso de au vida.
S.

Qulell maatfieste el estado de poblaolon de cuaIqulera de las

provinctas de este virreluto, COD la distillclc. de clases, sus ocupactones, ya
por el cultlvo. ya por la lndaatrla, los productos de eatos ramos, sus COIlSumos,
etc., •.• cien pesos.16
At the same time Belgraao's Es_ela de Dlbujg was established
with the approval of the viceroy but 8llbJect to the king's consent; aad shortly after,
the Es_ela de NQt1ca. 1be Es_ela de DlbuJo .... founded to live instructions
in desillling not only to artists but also carpenters, tailors, surveyors, etc. The
purpose of the Escuela de Na.tica was to model the spirIt of a l'ltlcleus of youths
in the severe disciplines of mathematical SCience and astronomy. Its mission was
16"Acta del 17 de marzo de 1798," Ibid., pp. 214-216.
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to be far vaster than forming simple pilots, for Belgrano envisioned. it as an
institute for an intereating exchange of ideas on the orientation of teachIng and
experimentation. At the end of three years both schools were suppressed. by the
croWD. as beilll mere luxury, and the consulado was severly reprimanded for having established them .17
In his autobiography Belgraao summarizes his years of fNstration

and defeat in the consulado before the time of the British invasions when he was
trying to awaken Buenos Airea to the need of free commerce and to the neceasity
of a vast edacatlow plan.

otros varios obJetoa de uttl1dad Y necesidad
promovt que poco maa 0 menos tuvteron el mtsmo
resultado 1 tocara al que escrtba Ia Maoria consular
dar una raZ01l de elIas; dlr' 10, por 10 que hace ami
prop6sttio, que desde el prlncipio de 17M, huta
julio de 1806 pas6 mt tlempo en lpal destino, hutendo
esfuerzos impotentes a favor del bien '(lidWtco; piles
totlos, 0 escollahan en el Gobierao de Buenos Aires,
o en la Corte, 0 entre los mtamos comerel.tes, indlviduos que oompon1. eate cuerpo, para quienes no
hab1a mb ruOa, al mle jll&ttela, nl mu utUldad. nt
mas neceaidad que au interea mercaattl; cualquiera
oosa que chocase oon eJ. eCOD.traba un veto, sin que
hubteae recu.rso para alajarlo .18
During these same years when Belgrlllo was gaintng renown, the
other great oreole leader, Mariano Moreno, was Uterallyin training for the role
17 Mitre, Htatori!, I, 156.
I

18Belgr&D.O, tlAutoblograffa," p. 179.

!

!
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he was destined to play with Belgrano in the Revolution of May.
Born in Buenos Aires in 1778 qfa poor but artistocratic famUy.
Mariano Moreno, received his education in the unlveratty at Chuquisaca, an Important center from which new Ideas spread. There. in the Academia Carolina.
the school within the university devoted to the study of Roman and Indian law.
Moreno with the other student lawyers debated the new theories of political economy while they prepared in a practloal way for the tribunals of the royal audiencla.
At Chuquisaca Moreno's moat tnfluential contacts included Felipe Antonio Iriarte.
a priest and revolutionary propagandist; the canon, don Matias Terrazas. whose
private library of enIlghtment authors he used; and Dr. Jose Antonio Medina, an
wtra-radical propapndi8t. 19
In addition to hi. study of law and the political economists. Moreno
developed his revolutionary bent by participating In a great polltical controversy
which had been raging in Alto Peru between Victoriim de Vlllaba, fiscal of the
audiencla of Charoas, an alleged precursor of the revolution, and Francisco Pawa
Sanz. an intendant at Potosi. In his "ntscurso sobre la mlta de potosi, tI publlahed
in 1793. Vlliaha had defended the Indians; the next year, Banz in support of the
polley of the!!!!!! attacked him; and from then on, everyone took sldes.20
19R1cardo Levene. Ensayo HlstOrico Sabre la Revolucl6n de Mayo
y Mariano Moreno (Buenos Aires. 1960). I. 40-43.
2°Levene, Ensaro Hlstorico, pp. 95-97.

r
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Moreno heard VUlaba in a lecture and fell deeply under the spell of
his teachings. In his dissertation in 1802. "Sobre el servicio personal de los Indios
en general, y sobre el parUcular de Yanaconas y Mitarios," Moreno cited Villaba's
opposition to the!!!!!! and his attack on the arguments given by the miners of
Potosi.21
Moreno returned to Buenos Aires in 1805 as a lawyer and relator of
the audiencla. Probably. because of lack of personal contact with the cohesive
followers of Belgrano playing an active role in the public life of Buenos Aires.
Moreno gained his reputation in his private law practice and was not to become
predominant in poUtics untU 1806. when his economic ideas would be sharpened in
frequent contacts with Belgrano. whose disciple he became. From that time on
our study of Moreno will throw light on the inner nature. the jurldicial-eeonomic
institutional essence of the Revolution of May.
The press was a potent factor in accelerating the new creole ideas,
and was wisely used by Belgrano, Moreno, and the other creole leaders as an
efficacious instrument of propaganda; therefore, in its early history one can discern
symptoms of the dawning of the Revolution of May.
In 1800 when Francisco Antonio Cabello y Mesa came from Lima to
establish a newspaper in Buenos Aires, Belgrano Influenced the consulado to
21
1956), I. 29-33.

Mariano Moreno, Escrltos, ed. Ricardo Levene (Buenos Aires,

I
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promote his proposition. On Aprll 1, 1801, appeared the first issue, headlined
el Telegrafo Mercantll, Rural, Polfticoe Econ&mico e Hiatoriograt'ico del R{o de
la

Plat~

through the initiative of Francisco Antonio Cabello, native of Extremadura,

lawyer. colonel, and former editor of el Mercurio Peruano.22
From the outset Cabello praised the work of the Sociedad de Amantes
del pats In Lima and revealed his proposal to estabUsh a similar patriotic-literary
and economic society in Buesnos Aires whloh the consalado was going to take under
its protection. Belgrano and Cabello were designated to draw u.p the statutes of the
society for which the viceroy had given approval, but when the royal order of approbation arrived It sanotloned only the newspaper.23
The Tel!Jrafo Mercantll, usually publ1shed weekly, lasted untll
October 1'1, 1802. The news was lenerally about navigation, price levels on local
market. Eu.ropean matters reported from the gazettes of Madrid, 8Dd isolated data
about commerce; at times, diverse articles and coatributors dtaoussed education,

agriculture. commerce, indlastry, and the port of Buenos Aires. Manuel Belgrano
wrote for It, and so did the lawyer, .Tuan Castelli; the engineer, Pedro Cermo;
22"Carta de Don Francisco Antonio Cabello al Ministro de Estado
y Hacienda de 22 de agosto de 1801," DAle m, 141.
23"Cara de Prior y C"'OIlsales de Buenos Aires al Seoretario de
Estado de 14 de agoato de 1801," .!2!!b. p. 145.
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and the naturalist, Tadeo Haenke.2"
The Tel6grafo was not. as has been pretended, a newspaper deaf to
the voice and demands of the public. Actually, the paper had developed a program
to diffuse useful knowledge for agriculture, indllatry, and commerce, and to stimulate new industries ncb as the salting of meat, the codfish plants, the tanning of
leather, and canvas maklng.25
One of the moat difficult queatiCllls to clarify is the suppression of
the TelHrafo Mercanttl by express order of the Ylceroy, Joaquin del Plno, who
had "quttado las ltcenelas al ver el &buso de ellu Y perlc1a en la elecciOn de
materiu para el desempeno de las ateneiones que habia ofrecldo al pUblico."

26

Moat authors are of the oplnlon that the article, "Politica, Circumstancla en que se halla la proYinola de Buenos Aires e Islas MalYinas y modo de
repararse," appearin, Thursday, October 8, 1802, precipitated the paper's

SU8-

pen8ion becau8e It "sublevo el amor propio de tedo8 108 veoinos de Buenos Aires,
..

tanto peninsulares como nacldos en el pats."

2'1

24

..

Juan Pablo Ecbague. "EI Periodlsmo," Hi8toria de la Naelon
Argentina. ed. Ricardo Levene (Buenos Aires, 1960), IV, see. 2, 5"-56.
25 Levene, En8ayo Historlco, I. 35.
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"Carta del Prior y Coosules de Buen08 Aires al Secretarlo de
Estado de 11 de dlc1embre de 1802," DAI, In, 154-155.
2'1

~

Jose Toribio Medina, Historia y Bibliografla de la Imprenta
(La Plata, 1892), pp. 1"6-1"'1.
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However, Carlos Correa lAma. Agusto S. Mallie, and Romulo

..

Zabala established in accord with Zinny that this article was only a pretext used
by the viceroy to stop the controversial isaues and propaganda disseminated through

the paper. Moreover, Cabello had also become involved tn the wheat controversy
rqiDg tn the eonsulado between the merchant guUd and the hacendados over the
arbitrary reaulatlon of commerce. The hacendados claimed that it was impossible
to make calculatlou baaed on stable situations because prices depmded on the

greater or lesser fiexlbUlty of the regtdores. and on the mUd or harsh character
of the governor or viceroy \\bo adjusted them. "Se consiguio comer en 108 seis
prlmeros meses del aDo

COD equldad.;

pero ••• dice el redactor de El Teregrato,

temta la caresUa, que toctos sabeD suced(o • • • el pueblo se afllge y con ruem
cwmdo pasa de sels pesos el valor del trigo. ,,28
An extra-special Wldateci Issue of the TefeEafo MercantU announced

that Juan HipOlito Vleytes would start a newspaper entitled el Semanario de Agrl-

C!l_a. Indutrla,

y

Comercio. EI Semanario presented a more far-reaching

program and was more nationaltn ita scope.2D
The issues of the Semanarlo from 1802 to 180'1 displayed an interest
28Juan Agustin Garc1a. La Ciudad lnd1ana (Buenos Aires, Hi53),
pp. 252-254.
29ued1D.a, p. 146.
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in science, commerce, and education. An article on education stressed the fact

that men in America living in fertile regions with large populations were never"
theless poor, and since ODly education could improve the situation, it was unfor-

tunate that there was no agricultural school to serve this purely agricultural
people. Another issue stated that the arts and crafts in America should be confined exclusively to free men; therefore, not only should slaves be barred from
crafts. but the slave traffic should be ended, since it not only caused misery to
the slaves, but helped perpetuate poverty in America by making the arts and
crafts unenticing.SO

In the forefront of the editorial staff was Belgrano who argued not
only in favor of production and of industry to promote the riches of the region,
which

was in great part the poliey of the Tel'P'afo. but alao to integrate their

indispensable complement, the opening of the porta to the 'natos del pds and thus
assuring trade and prosperity. Belgrano also managed through the pages of the
newspaper to advance apinat the colonial bureaucracy those economic cnticisms
that would be tolerated from the peninsular point of view and would awaken a reasonable public opinion in Buenos Alres.Sl The chief characteristic of Belgrano's
journalism was the attempt to apply to local needs and problems the doctrines of
30

.

Robert Jones Schafer, The Economic SocleUes in the Spanish
World (Syracuse. 1958). p. 242.
31lngenleros. I, '19 80.
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European writers. Although these problems were almost exclusively economic,
there is no doubt that whoever was touched by the lnfluence of this liberal thought
would soon extend his inquiry into political views, confronting them with the same
point of view that he took toward economic data.
The problem as Belgrano saw it was essentially economic; the program that he advocated was one of economic development; the help that he needed

was economic freedom because Spain's prohibition of direct trading with foreign

countries handicapped the ut1lizatton of Buenos Aires t natural resources. As
leader of a small determined creole faot1on in Bllenos Aires, he formed a nucleus
of economic ideas and convictions which he tried to ineulcate in the new generation.

The most transcendant fact in the IUe of Buenos Aires was preCisely the imposition
of liberal pollcies by the crown and their reception by the enlightened creoles who

tried to carry these ideas to their logical conclusion. The result was that progress
would be made in the economic field, and also to some extent in social action and
education; but the advantages of SpaIn's imperial controls were almost entirely
monopolized by the Spaniards from the mother countl'J. As the movement of protest agalnat Spain gained momentum one of the principal grievances of the creoles
was their exclualon from high office In Buenos Aires. In addition the creoles were

almost entirely excluded from big business, for the Spanish commercial houses
found it to their Interest to be represented by the Spanish merchants.

30

At the beginning of the nineteenth century there was needed some

jarring event to tear Buenos Aires away from the crown. What the creoles opposed
was not so much Spain's abusive exercise of power over them as the possibility of

its exercise.

CHAPTER

m

THE BRITISH IN BUENOS AIRES
In truth, the economic and administrative reforms of the Bourbons

breathed new life into the city of Buenos Aires. Their effects on the value of
trade were atrildDg, but they did not go far enough. They stimulated a greater
economic autonomy and a sort of regional nationalism; they contributed Itke the
American and French revolutions to a freer play of ideaa and a greater Intellectual
activity; they uslsted the development of an Increasinpy self-conscious. wealthy,
"cated creole bourgeoisie for whom the control of trade by a relatively small
group of Spanlsh monopolists became yet more unbearable.
Bat wbat chance theae reforms mlpt have had. of arresting foreign
pressures In Buenos Aires was ruined when Spain went to war with England In 1'196.
From that time

011.

blockades DUl1lfled the Spanish attempts at reform. Baeno.

Aires wu then thrown upon Its own resources; and New England, New York, and
Penuylvanla merchants saw their opportunity and sent ships to Bu.enos Aires
without benefit of treaty.
By reason of the location of Its

port., the number of Its merchant

marine, and its polley of neutrality toward France and England, t1n1ted states'
trade with Baenos Aires Increased after the neutral trade decree of November 18.
1'19'1; but

DO

relaxatton of the law8 had been authorized for the enemy British. At

32

the same time, numerous English vessels fiylng the American

nag,

aroused

Spanish jealouay that the suppoaeely neutral trade would actually be strengthening
her enemy, thus causing her to revoke the neutral trade decree of November 18,
1'19'7.1 To repeal neutral prhl1eges would be largely a paper action, impoaaible

to enforce:

80

this play of circwnstaDcea helped United State. merchants to keep

up the fiow of Buenos Aires' imports and exports even in time. when royal permiaaion was lacking.
So lax was the enforcement of the new decree, however, that on

July 18. 1800. the kID, addresaed a Ylgoroua reprimand to the Ylceroy in.iating
on more effecUve comp1l8llce with the law.2
This admOD1UGD was eyentually heeded, for sporadically the ban
on neutral trade was enforced with considerable Ylgor. While daring the years
1801 and 1802 there were at least forty-three United states merchant veaaels In

the varioaa ports of the Rto de la Plata, some of which had remained there for
oyer a year, there do not appear to have heeD more than ten or twelve daring the
year 1803. and during the year 1804 the number was still further reduced. 3
l"Real Orden de 20 de abrll de 1'199," DHA. VII, 158.
2"Real Orden de 18 de julio de 1800," Ibid., PP. 181-182.
3Charle. Lyon Chandler, "United States Merchant Marine Ships
in the RIo de la Plata (1801-1809), as shown by Early Newspapers," HAHR. D,
No. 1 (February 1919), 26-27.
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stapat10n of trade burdened landowners. merchants, and exporters in Buenos
Alrea. NeHsstty undermined Spanish mercantUtsm and overcame fears of penalUes as United states ships disposed of Buenos Aires products.
In an editorial in the Tel'arafo KercanUl, June 1801, Cabello wrote

that Spain should suspend Its mercantilist laws since European wars, blockades,
and drought had ruined commerce. He urged that since SpaIn could not supply its

colonyt the remecl.y was apparent even If It should help American, English, or
French merchants.4
For nearly two cmturles the British commercial interest in Ltverpool and Kanehestar had been engaged in clandestine trade with Buenos Aires,
but after the loss of the oolOl11ea in the American Revolution it was Imperative

that SpanIsh American ports be Opal to Engllllh trade. To fully understand the

reasons for this tranaformaticm one must tum to a consideration of British polley
after 1804. 5
By 1804 the Industrial RevolutlCll had already worked its magic upon

EngUsh Indlatry so that the market of Buenos Aires seemed particularly attractive.
Furthermore. the rumors of dissatisfaction emanating from Buenos Aires gained
4 Harry Bernstein, Origins of Inter-American Interest: 1700-1812
(PhlladelphIa, 1945), p. 42.
5 Wl1ltam W. Kaufmann, British Poll and the Inde Hence of
LatIn America: 1804-1828 (New Haven. 1951), pp.1-6.
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additional importance with the activities of Miranda. In 1803 he had struck up a
friendah1p with Sir Home Popham, a naval captain, whose eondllct was being in-

vestigated for alleged financial misdemeanors.6
Popham soon became a convert to Miranda's cause, and 1D. a memoir
dated Octobert 18M, the t\YO promoters OIltlilled to the British ministers their

project for the liberation of Spanish America." Execution of the plan, accepted
ill prlnetple by successive cahillets ill Eqland, was delared so long that in the
meantime Popham had gone with a fleet to p.ID control of the Cape of Good Hope.
Soon after the fall of the Cape, Popham determilled on his own responsibllity to
make an attack

OIl

Buenos Aires having learned that the city had become the re-

pository for a large amount of specie from Peru.8

On April 14, 1806, Popham set sall for Buenos Aires with a regiment of soldiers under the command of Sir WIlliam Beresford. They were soon
followed by a grand concourse of merchants eager to pour a mass of British goods
iIlto Buelloe Aires.9
6 WUliam S. Robertson, The LUe of Miranda (Chapel Hlll, 1929),

I.

261.

1~
8H• S. Fems, Britain and Argentina In the NiIl.enth Centu!'1
(Oxford, 1960), p. 23.
9

R. A. Humphreys, Liberation ill South America: 1806-1821
(London, 1952), p. 2.
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Although the Spanish authorities had been warned. the English
victory came with astonishing ease. The viceroy, Sobremonte, fled to Coldoba
at the approach of the enemy. and on June 21. 1806, Beresford's troops entered

I

i

I

Buenos Aires. Manuel Belgrano gave hls version of the events in his autobiography:
, !

Bahida es 1& entrada en Buenos Aires, del general
Berresford con mU cuatrocientos y tantos hombres en
1806 • • • El marques de Sobre Monte, viney que
entonces era de las Provlneias, dfaa antes de esta
desgrlU}lada entrada me Uamo para que formase una
compaita de Jovenes del comercto, de caballerla., y
qUe al efecto me daria oftetales veteranos para la
instrueel6n: los masque, no los enCGDtre; porque era
mucho el odio que habia a 1a mUtcta en Buenos Aires
con e1 cual no se habla deJado de dar algunos golpes
a 101 que eJerclaa 1& autorldad, 0 tal ves a eeta mlsma
que malDfestaba. demasiado IU debUldad.

I:

I

I',
i'l
!

,

I

I

'

II,

'I

"1
I!:1

'I

'

Be toGO 1a alarma general, y condaetdo del honor
punto de reuniOn; all! DO habra
orden n1 COIleteno en coaa algmla. • • ani se formaran
las compaD{as, Y 10 fue agregado a una de elias • • •

vole a 1& Fortaleza.

he la prlmera compaia{a cpae march6 a ocupar 1&
easa de las FUtplnas. mlentras dlsputaban las restantes
con e1 vtrrey de que ellas estaban para defender la
cludad y no sallr a campana, asf sOlo se re6ajeron
a oatpal' lu Barrancaa . . • 0

lcl

To revive the feelings of the stunned porteiios. Beresford immedl,

,

I

ately issued a proolamatlon guaranteeing the acImtnlstratlan of justice, the rights
of private property, the right of worship of the Roman CathoUe Church, and
l°Be1grano, "Autoblograffa," pp. 1'19-180.

I'i
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freedom of commerce.

11

However. he also required an oath of British allegiance;

whereas. Popham did not intend to subjugate. merely liberate.
The decree opening the port of Buenos AJ.res to free trade made
possible the exportation of great quantities of hides and other products destined to
perish due to lack of commercial possibWtJes. Besides, the English had reduced
the duties on imports from 34-1/2% to 12-1/2%; had abolished the state monopoly
on salt and tobacco; had suppressed the customs on trade with the interior provinces t
thus opening the eyes of the pgrtep.os to the disadvantages of the colonial system
12
1mder which they lived.
Popham and Beresford had mistaken both the temper and the capabilities of the people of Buenos Aires. United in fury against the English, both
creoles and Spaniards joined in planning their expulsion. A great deal has been
said about the heroic resistance of the people of Buenos Aires to the English invasionB. but another fact has been sufficiently stressed -- the spontaneous and
willing support offered to Buenos Aires by the inhabitants of the interior.
The minutes of the cablldo meeting for December 22, 1806. record

proof of this sort:
Be racino un ofic1o de don Juan Gomez Roldan,
escrlto deade la ciudad de Cordova en que ofrece

lIS. H. WUcocke, Histoty of Buenos Aires (London, 1807), p. 352.

12

~81o-1860

S. Samuel Trifllo. La Argentina Vista pgr ViaJeros Jng!eses:
(Buenos Aires, 1959), pp. 39-40.
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costear dOB SOldadOB de infanterla de lOB que alisten
para defensa de 1a patrla • • •
Be recivio un oficio de don Ramon Tadeo Delgado,
en que expone estar pronto a baJer con las mllicias de
su mando al primer anso que se Ie de • • • para
defenza de 1a Patriae
While these and simllar offers of aid were being read, the porter

annoUJlCed the arrival of ten Ind1ans from the pampas who came personally to
discUBS

the way in which they could help:
• • • 08 ofrecemos nuevamente reunidos todos los
grandes casiques que veis, hasta el numero de veinte
mil de nuestros subdltoa, todos game de guerra y
cada qual con cinco cavallos; ••• 14
.

For the first time the word tlpatria" is heard, and it crystallizes
around the commercial center of Buenos Aires accentuating it as the political
pivot of the nation.
Led by santiago Linters, the French-born captain of the port of

En&eD.ada. a volunteer army routed the British on August 12, 1806, capturing

General Beresford and 1,200 of his troops. Hysterical applause followed this
achievement, and the people wanted to set up L1niers as viceroy. In the meeting
of the cabUdo abierto the junta of notables named Liniera as civU and military
13"Acuerdo de 22 de dtc1embre de 1806," Archivo General de la
Nacion: Acyerdos del extJnguido cabUdo de Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires, 1926),
Serie IV t Tomo II, Libro LXI, 363.
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governor of Buenos Aires. 15
At first Sobremonte refused to assent, but convinced by the attitude
of the cabildo that opposition was useless. he delegated the military command to
IJniers and the civil government of Buenos Aires to the audlenCia. 16 However,
Sobremontets attitude laid the foundation for a coufl1ct with the cab1lcio. The repercU8sioDS resulting from thts disagreement had a great Influence on the role Mariano
Moreno would play as the py.eblo took the lDlttatlve in 1810. It can be said that
August 14, 1806, signaled the beginning of the destructton of the colonial regime
and was the unsuspected prologue of the Revolution of May.

In his Memony on the first Engllsh invasion, Moreno points out the
sufierings to which Bobremontels imprudence exposed the people of Buenos Aires
and recalls their triumphs through the centuries:

En tan tr1ste sltuacion no quedaba otra esperanza
que nuestro fiel y numeroso veclndario. Esta ciudad
hi fundado los tttulos de ml\V leal y guerrera con que
ae va condecorada, en repettdos y brillantes triunfos
que hi consequido sabre 8US enem1gos. Pocos pueblos
hin sufrido tanto\ rtaques. n1 108 hin resistido con
tauta gloria. • •
15"Carta del Cabildo de Buenos Aires al Virrey Marques de SobreMonte de 14 de agosto de 1806," ~. mt 229.
16uCabildo del 2 de septiembre de 1806," Acuerdos, Serie IV,
Tomo U. Libra LXI, 294.

17 Moreno, Escritos, I, 59-60.
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Buenos Aires, a city of some 40,000 inhabitants soon had the
appearance of an armed camp. In September Ltniers had issued a dramatic call
for the foundatIon of a people's militia. Ten infantry battalions were formed: five
of European Spaniards; three of
and mulattoes; and

ODe

wrteno creoles lmown as

Patricios; one of Negroes

of natives from the interior provinces. The creoles, at the

suggestion of Belgrano, selected CorneUo Saavedra as their commander. From
then

untn May 25.

1810, little could be done in Buenos Aires without count1ng on

the support of Saavedra who in turn depended on the Patrtclos.

18

The British government failed to understand that Beresford had been
defeated not by the m.ach1nat1ons of a few Spanish monopol1attc merchants and bureaucrats but by an uprising of the people themselves. The successive arrival of
reinforcements numbering some 11.000 men by the beginning of 1807, suggested
the seriousness of the approaching effort to recapture Buenos Aires.
Expectantly the city aw&Ued the dq of the assault and speculated
where the first blow would fall. The answer was given in January when;;le British
laid siege to Montevideo. LSniers' expedition to help the city soon returned, their
march interrupted by the news of the surrender of MonteVideo on Fe1mlary 3. For
this disaster Sobremonte was again held responslble.

19

I
I

I

'I
18

.
GuUlermo Furlong, S. J., La Revoluc16n ge Mayo (Buenos Aires,

1960), p. 48.
19"Informe de Liniers." Memorias de los Virrey;es. pp. 557-558.
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Turbulent crowds gathered on February 6 before the doors of the
cabUdo to depose Sobremonte. strange as it lll8¥ seem, the first popular movement
was directed by the Spaniards Wlder the orders of Alzaga, whose lrreconcUable and

Wldaunted hatred of the rebellious creoles would later cause the end of his own
career. But Alzaga was also not of a temper to put up with an imbecWc rule, even
on the part of the king's vice-regal representative. A junta of notables, mostly
Spaniards, agreed to arrest Sobremonte. Bowing to the popular wm, the audencia
decreed the suspenston and arrest of Sobremonte and appointed Linters as commander of aU the troops.20 The action against Sobremonte had an unmistakable
revolutionary s1gnU1oance because "por la primera vez

Be

vio en las colonias

amerlcanas a1 representante legal del soberano, destitufdo y reducido a prlslon.
Era que en efecto el poder colonial habta caducado de hecho y la revoluclon segura

au camino." 21
It waa under this mixed semi-royal, semi-republican government
that the defense of Buenos Aires against the invasion of General Whitelocke was
organized. On June 28 eight thousand British landed at the port of Ensenada and
advanced on Buenos Aires. Koeble adds, "Simultaneously with the forces of war
arrived the messengers of commerce. Convoyed by the frigates, merchants and
20
1843),

n, '18-80.
21

J. P. and W. P. Robertson, +etters on South America (wndon,

Mitre, Historl!, I, 201.
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clerks sailed out in shoals, bearing samples of bales and beers, cutlery and
cloths.,,22
Alzaga caused fortifications to be erected on all sides of the city;
soldiers took positions at the windows and housetops on the streets through which
the invaders passed. As the Br1t1sh troops advanced under Whitelocke and Crawford,

I'I
Ii

I

I

they were met by firing from every window and roof. On July 6, Whitelocke accepted
Liniers' terms of surrender. and for the first time in months the merchants of
Buenos Aires could trade again.

23

For Britain, the invasions of Buenos Aires were little more than an
unfortunate episode in the opeD1ng of Buenos Aires to BrItish trade. Ferns remarks,

"Popham'. professed economic liberalism never went very deep. nor was It based
upon the confidence that in a genuinely free market Brltish products and mercantile

enterprise would show to the advantage of the nation."

24

The British mercantile

community was even less enthusiastic about commercial freedom than Popham and
Beresford. Castlereagh wrote to Whitelocke that he disagreed with opening the port

ii

j

i

, I",

to neutrals for wine and spirits for eight months because the speculations of the

: 'i'illl

I,

BrItish merchants seemed to deserve every encouragement. Conquest by liberals.

22

W. H. Koeble, Briti.,h E!plolts in South America (New York,

1917), p. 149.

23

Bernard Moses,

fk>a1nt s Declinlng Power in South America

(Berkeley. 1919), pp. 362-363.
24 Ferns , pp. 50-61
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thus appeared to differ not at all from conquest, and the creoles and Spaniards of
Buenos Aires mew what was the real character of the enterprise set on foot by
Popham.

25
In 1807 and 1808 other invasions were hoped for, and other expedi-

tions were planned to Buenos Aires, but their aim was emancipation not subjugation.
Britain's true interests were commercial not imperial.

26

A British offlcer described the effect of the invasions on the sensible
and well-lDformed men of Buenos AIres: "They begin to feel their strength, and
with a strong inclination to employ it in an interest more immediately connected

with themselves, than what was theirs in the last contest, which only decided upon

!

I

which of the two European powers they were to be dependent • • • These sentiments
they made no hesitation in openly avowing before the Britt. officers in the Castle,
and it Is problematical whether Buenos Aires, and perhaps all South America will

not be more irrecoverably lost to the Spanish nation, by the issue of the English
invasion, than if It had fallen under our subjugation at this moment."

27

2~, p. 51.
26

Humphreys, p. 12.

27

Anon., An Authentic Narrative of the Proceeding! of the Expedition
under the command of Brigadier-General Craufurd. with an account of the operations
aglnst Buenos Aires under the commang of Lieut. Gen. Whitelocke by an officer of
the exped1t1on (London. 1808), pp. 196-197.
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At this time Liniers was acting as mUttary and civU governor in
place of Sobremonte. He was appointed interim viceroy by the king in December,
1807. From that time on, British vessels were never absent, in actual fact. from
Buenos Aires. Engllsh merchants relied on the enlightened views and easygoing
ways of Liniers who tolerated the extensive trade that sprang up, as departing
English merchants dumped their goods on the market at Buenos Aires. He even

released from prison the North American adventurer. William P. White, who had
openly collaborated with the British.

28

Indeed, Linters' interest in the clandestine trade seems to have been
one of the factors in the bltter quarrel between him and Alzaga. the wealthy merchant
leader of the Spaniards in Buenos Aires. Robert Staples, a British merchant who
participated in th1s trade. reported to the Foreign Office that between 1808-1809
thirty-one British vessels arrived at Buenos Aires bearing cargoes valued over a
mUlion pounds. On the foundation of this trade a British community began to grow
up in Buenos Aires. 29

The experience of the British invasions left a permanent impression
on the history of Buenos Aires. In the struggle, they had gained lmowledge of their
strength and a vigorous sense of nationality; they had indeed tasted power and would

·I!,I
I:
III,

28
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Dorothy B. Goebel, "British Trade to the Spanish Colonies,

1796-1823," ARB, XIm. No.2 (January, 1938), 308-309.

29 Ferns, pp. 67-68.
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not willingly relinquish it again. Why couldn't they direct this same force against
Spain 1

30 Moreover, the presence of a British community in Buenos Aires and its

trading activities became one of the pivotal points of political tension between the

creoles and the Spanish merchants who would have liked to see the British
expelled. 31
Although the popular movement which led to the Revolution of May
had begun in earnest with the English invasions, a conversation between Belgra.no
and

Crawford reveals the fact that the creoles st111 felt independence was remote:
• • • desplegO sus ideas .oerea de nuestra 1ndependencia, .oaso para formar nuevas esperanzas de
commun1cacioo en eslos paises t ya que hablan sa1ido
fal11das las de conquista: Ie hiee ver cui! era nuestro
estade, que ciertamente nostros quenamos el Amo
viejo 0 nlnguno; pero que nos faltaba mucho para
aspirar a la empresa, y que aunque ella se reallzase
bajo la protecctOn de la Inglaterra, esta nos abandonarla
51 Be ofrecfa 1m partido ventaJoao a Europa, yentonces
vendri'amos a caer bajo la espada espanola, no habiendo
una naci6n que no aspirase a 5U Interes, sin que Ie diese
culd.do de los males de los otros: convino conmigo y
mantsfest8ndole Cu8mo nos fsltaba para lograr nuestra
1ndependencia d1flrt6 para un siglo su consecuclon. 32
In December t 1807, the cabUgq of Buenos Aires conscious of the

prestige it had earned in the recent defense of the region petitioned the crown to
30TrUllo, p. 39.
31 Ferns, p. 68.

32 Belgranot "Autobiografla," p. 186.
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grant it the title of "Conservador de la America y Protector de los demas Cablldos
del Virreynato." In requesting the title. Buenos Aires posed as leader of mtmicipal
life in the viceroyalty. the benefactor who could help its poor neighbor. "el organo
por donde los demas Cablldos dirijan sus recursos

a V.M. TrlbunaJ.es de la Corte. y
..

Gefes superiores de estas Prov1ncias en soUcitud de las gracias 0 de la justicla."

33

The petition was written by Marian Moreno, the legal adviser of the cabildo.

The passage of the year 1807 marked a turning point in the history of
Buenos Aires. The rancor toward the English intruders hardly survived their departure; dissatisfaction with Spanish rule became by contrast, widespread. Buenos
Aires was already prepared for Its role in the Revolution of Mit}".
It is worth noting that the English invasions of 1806 and 1807 caused
the creoles of Buenos Aires to move to the forefront of society and the pueblo to
recognize them as the authentic ruling class. A notion of nationality based on the
principles of birth in the colony and adherence to Its way of life was slowly forming.
The Spaniards were indifferent to the fate of Buenos A1res while the creoles were

concerned with its future.
33

Moreno, EfCrltol. I, 162-163.

CHAPTER IV

PRELIMINARIES OF REVOLUTION

Hardly had the echoes of the clash with the British died down, when
the creoles entered on the long and tortuous course that ended in the Revolution of
May 26, 1810. The immediate occasion for the pronouncement against economic
and political maladjustments between Buenos

European poltttcs, and not to

8.Dy

A1rea and Spain was attributed to

particular crisis in colonial administration.

Loyalty to the Spanish monarchy was probably the one bond that held the J)Qrteiios

to Spain and that bond was &everly tried by events after the Napoleonic occupation
of the mother country.
The invasion of Spain by Napoleon proved two points

to the expectant

creoles in Buenos Aires: the first was the deblltty of the mother country; and the
second, the unwelcome fact that they might suddenly find themselves subject to an
even more despotic ruler. By the summer of 1808 the affairs of Spain were in
crisis, and in Buenos Aires formidable factions prepared to contend for the mastery
of thlll commercial heritage of the Spanish crown.
Fleeing the approach of the French invaders, the Portuguese Prince
Regent Joao and his court had salled under British escort to Buenos Aires on
November 29, 1807. The threat of a vengeful BrazWan attack was now joined to

47

the menace of the third British invasion.

1

The aggressive diplomacy of the prince gave substance to these fears.
He dispatched an emissary with an offer to take the people of the viceroyalty under
his protection, promising to respect their rights and liberties and to establish complete freedom of trade. Should they reject the offer, he would be compelled to join
with England against Buenos Aires.

2

Confusion in the minds of the creoles of Buenos Aires as to British
policy towards them began with the first attempt of the Portuguese court to occupy
the territory south of Brazil. From March 1808, the Portugueae tried to bully

Buenos Aires into handing over the Banda Oriental. Spanish authorities were convinced that Lord strangiord, the Brtt1sh minister in Rio de Janeiro, was behind it.

When the British Admiral Sir W1ll1am S1dney Smtth Joined with Joao about the projected occupation of as much La Plata territory .. could be seized, strangford

acquiesced in the scheme and even asked Smith to make sure Britain received
either Montevideo or Buenos Aires. strangford had followed the line of the BrU1sh
policy before the Anglo-SpanIsh alliance. at1ll entirely unsuspected in South America.

First, rumors. then definite news came of Britain·s changed relations with Spain;
1 Levene , ''lntentos de independencla,"1!&. V, sec. 2, 388.
2

"Acuerdo de 15 de marzo de 1808," Acuerdo!!, Serie IV, Tomo fit

Libro LXlI, 65.
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then, curtailing Portuguese aggrandizement in the Plata became one of strangford's
major activities.

3

Liniers and the caWOO vigorously rebuffed the Portuguese pretensions. In their deal1ngs with Prince Joao and in their preparation for defense they
acted 11ke the heads of an independent state. They were aided in their attempts by
strangford, who found that one of this main tasks was to protect Spanish interests
in the Plata. where the British government was not yet represented and where
French interference would have deprived Great Britain of an Increasingly valuable
market and source of raw materials. Also, Buenos Aires needed British trade,
since it had. no desire to become a dependency of France, and was anxious to have
assistance against Portuguese schemes.

4

By March 1808, Charles abdicated in favor of his son Ferdinand, and

Napoleon chose this momeDt to summon father and son to Bayonne in France. Rumors of th1a new crisis reached Buenos Aires in July. At the end of the month the
provincial authorities reoeived official word that Charles had abdioated in favor of
his son who should be proclaimed Ferdinand VU. Accordlngly the proclamation of

3J • street, "Lord straDgford and the Rio de 1& Plata, 1808-1816,"
HAHR, XXXIII, No.4 (November, 1963), 477-481.
4Joao Pandta Calogeras, A History of
Martin (Chapel H1ll, 1939), p. 69.

BrazY, trans. Percy Alvin
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the new ldng was fixed for August 12, but was postponed owing to conflicting
reports. 5
To add to the confusion the Marquis de Sassenay, an envoy of
Napoleon arrived in Buenos Aires on August 13. His generalinstruct10ns directed
him to present to Linlers the papers with which he was entrusted, to oollect information ooncernlng the general state of the Plata provinoes and the trading possibilities with Buenos Aires; aDd in particular, to observe the reaction of the colonial
officials to the news from Spain. His dispatches reviewed the events whioh had
occasioned the renWlciation of the Spanish crown by Charles and his son and annoWloeci Napoleon's selection of his brother Joseph as king of Spain and the proposal
to oonvoke a cortes at Bayonne.

6

The audlencia and cabilOO of Buenos Aires decided to cast

de Sassenay's dispatches into the fire; they ordered him to return to Bayonne,
and set August 21 for the proclamation of Ferdinand as ldng.

However, the cautious

and ambiguous address issued by Linlers with the advice and oonsent of the cabUdo

faUed to answer the questions in the public mind. The address spoke respectfully
of Napoleon, assured the people of his good wishes for Buenos Aires, and advised

5Vicente D. Sierra, Historia de 1& Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1960),
IV, 388.
6

~

~

Marques de Sassenay. Napole6n I y la Ftmdaci6n de la Republica
Argentina, trans. Teresa Amalia Cappa (Buenos Aires, 1946), pp. 102-104.
1
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them to imitate their ancestors, who during the War of the Spanish Succession,
awaited the destiny of the mother country in order to obey the legitimate authority
which occupied the throne.

7

Buenos Aires proclaimed Ferdinand

vn the new king on August 21.

Official efforts to conceal the fate of the Spanish monarchs now imprisoned in
France proved useless; for two days later a new envoy, Goyeneche, arrived in
Buenos Aires. His dispatches revealed that not only had the supreme junta installed
at Seville revolted against Joseph, but that peace was being negotiated with England.

8

A small group of creole leaders headed by Manuel Belgrano took
special interest in the news from Spain and felt, "Dios mismo nos presenta la
ocasion con los sueesos de 1808 en Espana yen Bayou. En efecto, avivanse entonces las ideas de libertad e independencla en America, y los americanos empiezan
por primera vez a hablar con franqueza de sus derechos.,,9
But the conditions for the achievement of independence were not yet
present, for the people of Buenos Aires were still fanatically loyal to the king and
the established order. Levene explains that the ideas of emancipation had been
formulated in organic and explicit terms by a group of patriots some years earlier

7
~
Mario Belgrano, "EI Emisario, El Marques de Sasseuy," HNA, V,
sec. 1, 72-73.
8

~

Belgrano, "Autobiografia," 186.

9Ibid •
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than May, 1810, which were gradually enlarged from the time they had embraced
a plan of independence under an English protectorate or under Carlota WltU they
secured the cabUdo abierto of May 22.

10

The most influential advocates of independence, such as Belgrano,
Pena, and Paso, recoUed from revolution on the French and North American model.
They envisaged a peaceful transition to independence Wlder the auspices of a constitutional monarchy. A candidate was at hand in BrazU in the person of Carlota,
wife of the prince regent and sister of Ferdinand VU. The patriot leaders opened
negotiations with the princess, but they could hardly have made a more unfortWlate
choice because Carlota had very absolute views.

11

It is significant that strangford

!mew of this movement and could have brought it success by helping instead of hindering the plan. Instead he chose to follow his government's pol1cy.12
Joio was plqing a double game also. stm intent on revenge for
Spain's aid to France in the occupation of Portugal, he supported the plans of his
wife to be recognized as sovereign of the viceroyalty of the Plata. This he did in
spite of the fact that England would not now outwardly countenance any design hostile
10
"CabUdo del 18 de julio de 1809," Acuerdos, Serie IV, Tomo m,
Libro LXIV, 528-524.
11

"Santiago Limers," Anal.s de la Bibl1oteca, ed. P. Groussac
(Buenos Aires, 19M), m, 129.
12 street, pp. 482-483.
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to Spain. In these crucial days, Rio de Janeiro was a city of conspiracy, and James
Paroissien, a young English merchant who had arrived in Montevideo in 1807, was

now to be involved in the plots and designa of three very dissimilar but remarkable
personages: the Princess Carlota, Admiral Sidney Smith, and Saturnino Rodriguez
Pena, a poUUcal exile from Buenos A.ires.13
On the whole and despite the acquaintances he made in Rio de Janeiro,

Paroissien much preferred hls Spanish friends.

Humphreys remarked. ''It was,

indeed, in Buenos Aires, not in BrazU, that he wanted to be, and to Buenos Aires
that he intended to go as soon as he could, for several reasons. but principally because moat money is to be made there.,,14 So disposed. he eagerly seized on every
rumor that Buenos Aires was to be again attacked by the British, or that it would be
opened by the colonial authorities there to British trade.

16

Dr. Pena, who had aided General Beresford in his escape. had formed
a plan for declaring the independence of Buenos Aires under the auspices of Eng16
land.
He met Paroisslen in Montevideo, and on the evacuation of that city by the
EngUsh. the two sought refuge in Rio de Janeiro where they met Smith.
13
Humphreys, pp. 21-22.

l"tbid,. p. 19.

15xbtd.
16
Robertson, Letters on South America,
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Sir Sidney Smith had conceived a romantic devotion for Carlota and
had success attended their design to erect in Buenos Aires a throne for the princess,
Smith was to have received the title of Duke of Montevideo. It was at this point,
however, while strangford was doing his beat to thwart Carlota's plans by securing
Smith's dismissal and recall to England, that Pena and Paroissien actively entered
the story .17
Pen.. was acting as emissary for his old associates in Buenos Aires;
these included his brother Nicolas. Castelli, Be1grano, and others who commissioned him to sound out the princess on the question of a constitutional regency.
Paroissten bound on the Mary for Buenos Aires was the bearer of Pei1a's letters

to the revolutionaries and secret instructions for himself.

18

The reactionary views of Carlota were clearly revealed when she
denounced him in a letter to Linters as the bearer of documents "l1enos de principios
revoluclonarios y subverstvos del presente orden monirqulco, tendentes e1 establecimiento de una im.a.ginar1a y souba repUblica, la que Uempos hace eaU proyectado
por una porci6n de hombres miserables y de per1fidas intenciones ••• ,,19
17

..!2A!!,

V, 210-211.

18
Ibl!i., p. 188.

19"Carlota a1 Liniers,"~. V. 227.
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As the reactionary and absolutist views of Carlota became better
mown, the hopes she had aroused in many of the inhabitants of Buenos Aires began

to fade. 20 Because of her letters Paroisslen and Peful were thrown into prison,
but they would be defended by Cutelli in a spectacular trial in March, 1810. It
wu more than a defenae of Paroissien or even of Pen.; it wu a defense of the rights
of Spani&h Americans; and it was the complement in the field of politics, to the

arguments of Belgrano and Moreno in the field of economics.

21

MeanwhUe, the Spanish of Buenos Aires t equally convinced of the
impending separation of the colony from the mother country, Intrigued to depose
Ltniers and establish a governing Junta that would confirm and continue their monopoly of political and commercial privileges. Their leader was Martin Alzaga who
had always been critical of Linters' alien birth, h1s toleration of foreigners, and
his evident partiality toward the creoles and the French. With the outbreak of hosUlities between the Spanish patriots and Napoleon's government, the situation of the
French-born viceroy became precarious. His alleged disloyalty to Spain afforded
a pretext for the revolutionary plans of Alzaga and his followers in the cabUdo.

2~bid.
21DAB V t 194-219.

22Robertson, Letters on South America,

n,

77-84.
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Elio, the governor of Montevideo, was the first to give vent publicly
to this feeling. He refused to obey orders from Linters, denounced him to Spain as

a traitor, and convoldng the colonists, established an independent junta. after the
example of those set up in the mother country. The audiencia pronounced this
I

i

Montevidean movement to be illegal; yet Mzaga with his colleagues and partiSans,
conspired to imitate Montevideo, and to destroy the creole party by replacing
Ltnier8 with a governing junta. They fixed the date of their uprising for January 1,
1809, when the cabUdo chose Its membership for the comlng year.

23

The ceremonies of election began tranqu1lJy on that day, but at a
prearranged 8ignal, the city bell sounded the alarm, and Spanish troops crowded
into the plaza. The cry was, "Down with the Frenchman Liniers, a junta as in
Spainl" A cabi}sto abie!'l9. carefully selected beforehand for the purpose, met and
voted for a governing junta of Span1arda. with the exception of the two creole secretaries, Ju11an de Leiva and Mariano Moreno. Uniera had barely signed the required
document of resignation when the creole regiments entered with Cornelio Saavedra
at their head. Saavedra took Llniers to the plaza where cheering croWds greeted
him with assurances of loyalty. Alzaga and his ringleaders in the cabUdo were
arrested and exUed to Patagonia, only to be rescued by Elfo.24
28 sSr Woodbine Parish, Buenos Aires and the Provinces of the Rio
de la Plata (London, 1852), p. 78.

24Levene , "A80nada del lOde enero de 1809,".!ll!A, V,sec. 1,425-430.
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What was unusual in this affair was that on the side of the viceroy
were arranged the conservative audiencia, numerous other Spanish officials and
military leaders. whUe the creole Moreno collaborated with the cabUdo. From
this conflict the creoles emerged with a practical monopoly of mll1tary power and
greatly increased prestlge.

25

By involdng the formula of governing Juntas, more-

over, the SpaDlards themselves had established a revolutionary precedent that the
patriots would one day use with notable success.
Linters. compreheDding the true source and atrength of his authority,
now showed himself more than ever well-disposed toward the creole party. Belgrano
took advantage of this to urge the opening of the port of Bueno. Aires to British

trade as a means of diminishing the importance of rebellious Montevideo and reHeYing the financial distress of the government. The commander of the British

naval forces in the area seconded the efforts with the suggestion to Llniers that he
open the ports "for mutual convenience and regional benefits. raising revenue from

a tolerated commerce. ,,26
A potent argument for legalizing trade with England was the swelling

volume of contraband traffic, which afforded no revenue to the treasury and which
Liniers appeared unwilling or unable to halt. Indeed, it was charged that the viceroy
25"Ssntlago Lln1ers." AIm.
26

Goebel. p. 311.

m. 152-153.
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himself had connived at smuggling operations for personal profit. 27
Liniers, perceiving no other solution for the grave financial problems of his government, signified his approval for Belgrano's trade reform in
June 1809. Just then word came to Buenos Aires that the newly installed junta
central of SevUle had deposed the viceroy and that his successor, Baltasar Hidalgo
de Cisneros, was at Montevideo. Action on the proposed measure was immediately
suspended. 28
The removal of L1n1era. a victim of Spanish intrigue. angered the
dismayed creole party. They foresaw new efforts to restore European domination
and commercial monopoly.

Belgrano. Saavedra, CasteW. and other patriot

leaders meeting secretly in the home of Juan Martfn PueyrredOn, discussed a
project for offering resistance to Cisneros, but could reach no agreement. 29
Cisneros, doubtful of the reception that awaited him, remained
at Colonia unt1l Liniers himself came to escort him to the capital wh'lre be quietly
took possession of his office on July 29, 1809. He discovered. reads his official

report,

27 Koebel, p. 309.
28 Belgrano. "Autobiograffa. II p. 187.
29

Mitre, Hiatoria, I, 324-325.
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• •• Dos temibles partidos en Ip. capital, con ocasion del
suceso del dia 10 de enero del aiio pasado de 1809, un
tumulto popular en la ciudad de la Plata que invadio al
presidente de squella Real Audiencla, que 10 depuso, que
10 arresto y que atropello los respetos de las leyes y de
este superior Gobierno • • •
Ya habla consequido establecer la quietud pUblica, aunque
no desvanecer del todo las murmuraciones, la censura
del Gobierno, las especies sediciosa8, la diversidad de
opiniones sobre la suerte de Espana, los presentimientos
de independencia. stempre l1sonjeros al vulgo de los
pueblos. y otros males ponticos que hab1an originado en
este Vtrreinato el estado de la Espana y los notables
sucesoa anteriores ami mando. Pero en este estado se
presento de repente una nueva tormenta que llenara de
desconsuelo el real animo de v. m. en eetas distancias.
La setiuccion de unoa y la debUidad de otros han sido au
U:nica causa: el pretexto ha sido la sUJflfata perdida de
Espana, y el objeto la independencia.
Revolution was obviously in the air and the Intellectuals formed a
secret society to direct the agitation toward the establishment of a locally-elected
government. The original intention seems to have been not to declare independence
from Spain, but merely to insist on the right of the people to a voice in their local
government. The leaders of the revolutionary secret society were Manuel Belgrano,
Mariano Moreno, Nicolas Rodr.fquez Peu, Juan Jose Paso, HipOlito Vieytes, and
Juan Castelli. The conservative Cornelio Saavedra pledged his support whenever
the opportune moment for revolt should arrive. Cisneros proceeded cautiously in
Buenos Aires because of the superior power of the creoles, but he soon antagonized

30MemOrias de

108

Virrexe,. pp. 569-670.
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r

them by restoring Alzaga and his followers to their former places of honor. 31
Cisneros, like his predecessor, pondered the means of solving
the grave financial crisis of the colony: the need for additional revenue was
great; the viceroy's desire to conct11ate the creole party was strong. Reluctantly
he turned to con8ider the unorthodox expedient of free trade. When two English
merchants applied to him in August 1809, for permis8ion to sell their cargoes,
Cisneros referred the petition to the cab1ldo and the consulado with a favorable
recommendation. 32
The monopolist8 in the cabUdo, representing both 8ides of the

Atlantic t 1nd1oated the grave evils that would now from 8uch trade with foreigners
but grudgingly oonceded to the necessity of the measure. In the consulado the proposal of the viceroy won by a vote of seven to five, but Fernindez de Agiiero,
attorney for the ~nsuladq of C&d1z, submitted to Cisneros an able brief against
free trade. This innovation, he asserted, was contrary to the Laws of the Indies
and would prove fatal not only to the merchant marine of Spa1n. but also to the

agriculture and industry of Buenos Aires as well. 33 He presented himself as
the defender of the artisans in the craft guilds. championing their cause by POinting

31 Enrique de Gandfa. La Revision de la Historia Argentina
(Buenos Aires, 1962). pp. 66-66.
32 Levene, Ensgo HistOrico.
33Sierra,

A IV,
!!!L,

466-466.

m,

61.

I.

I

1

60

out that at that very moment there wu an English ah1p In the harbor loaded with

19,000 patrs of boots. 34
A letter written to the klDg four daTa after the 0J)8Il1Dc of the port
of Buenoa Alrea to the EagJSsh muatratea thta m.oaopo1t8t1c meatality.. In the

letter Pedro BaJtDo de Laya mOlDS about the ad pl1pt of "loa cochambSDoa. que

veRdI I. loa l1eazoa de a.lpdOn a doa realeSt doe., tree cuanmo 1a vara. y que los

iDIle.... los of.reolan a un reel T cartUlo; de loa cordoba..., cuyos ponchos de
atete pesos &bora . . .baa a tre., por obra de 108 extraajeroa • • • "S6
The .,. came wheJl the creole YaB4Idn tried to cany out their
eocmom1c Imblt.tcma aDd Mar1tmo Moreno champloDed them in the DCJW fam.ou

memoradum. Bepre""'clOD del "Apoderado de loa Labrador•• y Hacendad08
de lu campaDu de la Yanda 0deIltal ., OccideDtal del Rio de 1a Plata." en e1
exped1eDte nSobre el arbUrlo de onopr 1a 1DtrocIuoo16a de alguau negoctac1one.

Ingle•• , ft 30 de aept.tembn de 1809. 36

Mon thaD a defense of the v1cel'OJ't. propoeal of free trade as a
temporary fIn.notal expe4leat, the Repn_DtaoiOn was • 1'1gorou argument for
free trade as aeceaaary for the welfare of the people and 1n CODformtty w1th the

34lA'v'eae, EMIl9IJl1t6Ftc2. I. 298.
36n,w.. p. 28&.
36

MorellO.

EfCl"I.2I.

n.

S.
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laws of pol1Ucal econom,y. 37

What was on Moreno'. miDd CD be beat expreased in h1a

,

,

words: "Loa hombres, que hiD urddo 10 UUBtre a 10 utU.

'"

veil

own

deamenUda en

maestro Pals eata 1mpor&au.te maxlma: Y e1 vtaJero a'" quten .. tutruyese que la

uombrarJa quando buscaBdo at Labrador por su opuleacla.

DO

encoutrue sino

hombre. OODdeDlldoa , morlr en 1a mSaera." 38 .

human I.Dte1Ugeace to call atteDUoD to them. For example such Is the propo.lUom

!'

A 1a lmperloaaley la neoe8ldad ceden toda8 las I.e,.•• pu8s no tenleDdo

.Iitaa otro tiD que 1& couervaclon Y bleD de

108 eatadoa,

10 eonatquen con su

1nobaervancla. cwmdo oeurrenolu eXlraordSDar1u 18 hacen 1DeYttable. 39
)l

IndlgnaDt1y. Moreno apurued AgUero' a sugeaUon that lID abuDd-

anoe of foreign poda mlgbt be an evB for the country. for he was 19norIng a
primary prJnctple of pollUoa1 800D0my: "Nada.a

mY V8lltajoaa para una

Prov1nc1a que la &UJDa abuDd.ocla de loa Etecto& que ella no produce.

putt&

il

I'

3'1.l!Wl., p. 5.
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Y que solamente puede perjudicar a 108 Introductores. "

40

He told Cisneros that his first duty was to improve the public
weUare by all means within his power and that all the arguments presented in
an attempt to cause alarm and to destroy his praiseworthy free-trade plan were
false. To substantiate hla arguments, Moreno quoted a certain wise governor
who once sald that the only injuries to the country as a result of free trade would
be the following:

1.

riasgos

Que decaera el giro clandestino. por que nadie praferira sus

ala segurldad de una publica importaclon.
2.

Loa ocultoa Introductorea. que

Be

Uaman CoDtravandtatas,

careceran de este honrroso modo de pasar la vida, y tendran que tomar un £usn

6 aguja.
3.

Los Depend1entes del Resguardo no saran necesarios en tanto

nUmero. ni tendran tan crecldas obenclonea.
4.

Loa Sub-delegados y <temas parttc1pes en los Comisos quedan

5.

Decaera el esp1rltu mllitar a1n las conUnuaa batallas de 108

perjudicados.

contrabandistas •
40

Ibid. t p. 23.
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6.

IDs presidios no e8taran tan llenos si sa evita el grande

ingreso de los defraudadores, y los Curiales perderan mucho, faltandoles causas
de esta especle, que les son tan lucratlbas. 41
Moreno commented on the merchants worrying that free trade
would hurt the craftsmen aDd warned them not to be duped:

l, "Quten

creer&' 8

los Mercaderea de Buenos Ayres sinceramente consagrados al bien de los ArUstas
del Pais? Quando os digan que los IDgleaes traherin obras de todas clues,

.

respondedles que hacen tiempo se estan tntroduclendo innumerables clandest1namente
y que si esto es un gran mal, e110s solo h&n s100 sus amores." 42
In his conclusion, Moreno pointed out: ttNada as hoy

t8n provechoso

para la Espana como afirmar por todos los vinculos poslbles 18 estrecha union y
alianza de 18 Ing1aterra. Esta Naclon generoaa que conten1endo de un golpe e1 furor
de la Guerra, franqueo

anuestra Metropoli awdlios y socorros, de que en la

amistad de las Naciones no sa encuentran exemplos es acreedora por los titulos

mas fuertes 'que

DO

sa separe de nuestras especulaciones el bien de

SUB

VasallosJI£3

The value of Moreno's memortallies especially in its implied condemnation cf the colon1al mercantUe system and its opportune exposition of liberal
economic principles. This testament of the haceDdaOOs was warmly received and
41
42

!2IS.

t

p. 59.

Ibid•• p. 67.

43 !!W!., p. 87.
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widely read in creole circles, although Spanish censorship at the time prevented

publication. At that moment of uneasy expectancy such a departure from law and
tradition had unusual significance, for it meant the opening of a window into the
non-~an1sh

world that could never again be closed. It was a neat summary of

the confUct created by the divergence between the oreole interest in Buenos Aires
and the peninsular interest oentered in Seville and

C8d1z.

Meanwblle the three-month-old debate on the viceroy's proposal
for trade reform grew to a close. The whole affair made the Spaniards in Buenos
Aires hate Cisneros and plot his ruin. Thus the viceroy became entireJy isolated.
losing the support of the Spanish party wh1le he had never been able to gain the
confidenoe of the creole, and from then on his apprehensions and suspiCions would
only hasten the impending crisis. 44
On November sixth, the trade junta of Buenos Aires publicly opened

the trade of the port to the British who were in waiting to inundate the region with
their merchandise. Nevertheless, many vexing restrictions on trade remained:
foreigners could consign trade only to Spanish merchants t duties were unduly high f
and payment for imports had to be made one-th1rd in money and two-thirds in

produce. 45

44

45

Sierra, HDA, IV. 459.

-

"Acta de 6 de noviembre de 1809," DHA,

vn ,

379-383.

65

Although the decree was not, in actuality, definitive, this marked
an important step in the story of the development in the trade of Buenos Aires. The
decree soon justified itself, as contraband gave way to open commerce, with increased receipts from customs fUling the treasury and enabling the government
not only to meet expenses but also to show a favorable balance of 200,000 pesos
monthly. At the end of the year the total revenue amounted to 5,400, 000 pesos,
an increase of 4,200,000 pesos over the revenues recorded in 1808. This economic revolution which emancipated Buenos Aires commercially from the mother
country was the first bold step toward independence.

46

However, in December,

1809, in accordance with the orders of the Spanish government, all ports were

to be closed; and shortly after, Cisneros warned the British merchants that they
would have to leave the city within a short time. 'Ihis threat caused renewed uncertainty and gave an impetus to the surge of revolutionary feeling against the
Spanish government.
In the midst of the cOming storm, Buenos Aires was all anarchy
and confUSion, as was Spain among the contending juntas; but in Buenos Aires the
question was further entangled by the pretension of Carlot a to the regency of the
Indies. By this time the views of the patriots centered more and more on the
project of taking the government into their own hands, and the state of affairs
between Cisneros and the Spaniards in Buenos Aires greatly forwarded their designs.

46 Mitre, Historia, I, 340-341.
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The latter now began to court the patriots in order to put down the viceroy and
create a junta in his place. For this reason, when on the first of January the
election of the new members of the cabildo took place, they allowed one-half of
the offices to be filled with creoles, for the first time in the history of Buenos
Aires.

47
The first days of 1810 brought word from Spain that the armies

of Napoleon were driving toward total coDquest of the peninsula. The people of
Buenos Aires anxiously discussed what they wOlud tio when Spain fell to the invader.
Three courses were open: Independence, union with Brazil under Carlota, or submission to the new rulers of Spain. The Spaniards preferred to maintain the peninswar connection under all Circumstances, but military power rested in the hands
of the creoles and armed force would ultimately have to settle the question. Meanwhile news of further disasters in Spain aided Belgrano's efforts, for his tertulia
was becoming a patriotic club, separatist in aim. Saavedra, pressed to act, responded that he would at the fall of Seville, Vieytes with the Semanario, and Belgrano
with the Correo del Comercio, his new newspaper, would establish a current of
ideas that progressed from confidential whisperings to the advantages to be derived
from independence. 48

47 Robertson. Letters on South America, II, 89-90.
48 Enrique Ruiz-Guinazu, EpUanfa de I. Libertad (Buenos Aires,
1952), p. 162.

1,1
I,

i,

67

On May 13, an English ship brought news that Seville had fallen and

that the junta central had fled and dispersed. Cisneros frantically tried to keep the
news secret, bu1 it was soon !mown throughout Buenos Aires. Five days later he
published the news of the fall of Seville, which the leading creoles had fixed upon
as the signal for revolutionary action. They had been spreading the theory that

'I

since there was no king, there could be no viceroy, or vice-king. On May 19
,#

...

Belgrano and his associates assembled in the house of Rodriquez Pens and resolved

to proceed by the constitutional method of cabildo abierto.
Cisneros, the conservative officials, and the clergy realized what
the patriotic creoles wanted and what they would probably do to get it; therefore,
an unwilling viceroy and cabildo scheduled a cabildo abierto for May 22. 49
On May 21 the cabUdo met to consider preliminaries, while the

people in the plaza clamored for the removal of the viceroy. 50 T'ae next day at the
cabildo abierto the decision of the majority was that Cisneros should be deposed
and that the cabUdo should have authority until they would appoint a junta to rule,
pending the assembly of deputies from the provinces to establish the form of
government. 51
49Memorias de los Virreyes, p. 572
·'1

50"CabUdo del 21 de may de 1810," Acuerdos, Serie IV, Tomo IV,
Libro LXV, 108-111.
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"CabUdo ablerto del 22 de mayo de 1810," ibid., p. 130.
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The Spaniards, however. made one further attempt to stop the
inevitable current of public affairs. They influenced the government cablldo. a
cautious and conservative bot:W. to nominate a junta of five persons, two creoles.
namely saavedra and Castelli, two Spaniards. and Cisneros himself as president
of the junta. 62

This attempt to modify the decision of the cabtldo abierto and to
strengthen the viceregal authority aroused popular indignation. Colonel Saavedra,
having the confidence of his

own regiment, as well as an understanding with the

other commanders, awaited the viceroy on the twenty-fourth and advised him to
resign. A representation was drawn up and atgned by many of the lnhabitants, demanding a revocation of the first election, and giving the names of those who were

to constitute the Junta. Another public meeting was demanded and this was appointed for the following day. 63
On the historic May 26, 1810, the general clamor of the creoles

compelled a reluctant cabUdo to confirm a government nominated by the patriots:
Saavedra as president. Paso and Moreno as secretaries; Belgrano, Castelli,
Azcuenaga, Alberti, Matheu, and Larrea, as the other members of junta. On
the same day, the patriot junta installed itaelf in th~ citadel, the residence of

62 "Cablldo abierto del 22 de mayo de 1810, ft ibid., p. 130.
63 "Cabildo del 24 de mayo," ibid., pp. 163-154.
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the ancient rulers of the colony, and began to act in revolutionary fashion wh11e
invoking the name and authority of the king of Spain, Ferdinand VU. 64
The establishment of an American instead of a Spanish junta was
held to be nothing less than an insurrectionary movement. If it was a creole, it
was also a porteno revolution, an economic protest and the product of economic
exigencies. Nothing could stand between Buenos Aires and free trade; the economic emancipation was determined before the political emancipation began. Juan
IIII!I

V. Gonzalez claims that the Revolution of May 25 was only the fight over the

custom house of Buenos Aires. 55

the bonds of economic servitude, she would now be in conflict with. the rest of the
country. Buenos Aires would now try to play the leading role in both national and
world economy, but it would take a period of readjustment stretching over half a
century before the bitter economic antagonism between the interior provinces and
united action produced complete political independence.
In a very true sense Buenos Aires occupied a colonial position in

relation to Europe. It was a producer of raw materials and a consumer of manufactured goods. Why should the porteno buy his ponchos in Santiago del Estero

"Cabildo del 25 de mayo,"

!2!!!.,

pp. 160-174.

55 J ulio V. Gonza1ez. Historia Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1957),

pp. 148-168.
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Although the change in political control relieved Buenos Aires of

54

I
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when he could buy an English-made one for less? Why should he buy his wines
in San Juan and Mendoza when he could get French wines? This was the issue

that made the Revolution of May 25, 1810. and would later result in civil war
between Buenos Aires and the provinces. And so was born the porteDo mentality.
which may roughly be summed up as the inner conviction that the nation exists
for Buenos Aires. and that all outside the limits of Buenos ). ires is outside the
limits of civilization. 56

I
!I::

Buenos AireS, which was the sole port of entry and export for the
hides. wool, and other products of the provinces. wished to maintain its commerctal preponderance and saw in the movement against Spain an opportunity to do so.
As It made the tn1tlal moves for independence and undertook to direct the revolution It seemed to be attempting to assert its own sovereignty over the entire area
of the old viceroyalty. To the provinces it appeared that Buenos Aires was only

supplanting Madrid as the center of power. As Buenos Aires had once been notortous for its resistance to Spanish mercant1lism,

80

now would the interior provinces

stubbornly resist the new mercantilism of Buenos Aires that began on May 26. 1810.

56 Ysabel Rennie, The Argentine Republic (New York, 1945),
pp. 18-20.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
What oan be said, in the lipt of our present knowledge and of the

various revisicm1st taterpretatlona of the history of Buenos Aires and the background
of the Revolution of May 26. 1810?
The possibilities for a revision ia over-all interpretation of the Latin
American revolutioas are outlined 1a Charles Griffin" essay, "Economic ad SoCial
Aspects of the Era of Spaaish AmeriCID IIldepeadence." 1 This applies particularly

to the May Revolutioa at the port of Bue80s Aires in 1810.
The patriots in atenos Atres were enlipteneel. keen -witted. 01"8OOIlSOiou8 creoles who quarreled with the mother oountry because she denied them
their right. to participate 1a the govenunent &ad to .joy the profitable results of
commerce with the rest of the world. 'l1leir leaders represented.

&II

Professor

Bartag hu observed, "the amblt1OJl8 of the e6Ioatecl creole ows to aupplAllt the
pealaaular merchants 1a goverameat All. trade. " 2
In es.eaoe. thea. the tuk OODfroating BueDOS Aires before 1810 was

to e&tabUsh pre-emlaenoe ia the export-import trade. And whUe the 800ial tensions

lCharles C. Griffin, "Economic and Social Aspects of the Era of
Spanish American Iadependeace," RAHR. 1960. XXIX. 170.
2C. H. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America (New York, 1947).
p. 324.
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are gradually being more fully revealed, more attention must be focused on the
economic factor: to the effects in Buenos Aires, for example, of the innovations
introduced into the old commercial system, to the impace on Buenos Aires of the
commercial expansion of Europe, and to the economic interests between Buenos
.Aires and the outside world.
No one could deny the imperial organization and economic l1beralizaIi,

tion of the eighteenth century as vital prerevolutionary developments: the

openlng:i

of the port of Buenoa Aires by the free..trode reforms, the eatabl10hmeat of the

'\

viceroyalty with the capital of Buenos Aires, acoentuating and localizing the struggle
between the monopolistic Spanish merchants and the ambitious oreoles.
I.!I

Moreover. if we were to examine cond1t1Oll8 in Buenos Aires at the

Ir
I'J,
"

turn of the oentuxy t we would ttnd they were not materially different from what they
had been for decades except that the dissat1sfted creoles had begwl to discuss mat-

ters of lOOi81. economlo. and political interest. The intellectual movement which
had its beginnings in the last years of the eighteenth century, had developed with
heightening Intensity in the first decade of the nineteenth and was in some ways responsible for the revolutionary act1vities which began in 1810. Creole views slowly
but effectively took on aspects of liberality which could never have developed in the
conservative authoritarian royal omcials In Buenos Aires. The concept of an
abrupt transition during the days of May appears to be yielding to a more meaningful

concept of process; so that the period from 1780-1810 takes on an identifying
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economic characteristic; matters having arrived at this point. the polemic moved
from the purely economic level to the political ODe, wh,ere lines were vague and
not clearly defined. Isolation from Spain had encouraged economic autonomy in
Buenos Aires, and eooaomic theories were arising in Buenos Aires that reckoned
with a Dew commercial need.
111e cause of the revolution of May 25, 1810. pressed by Jose
Ingenieros as the major one, was always the economic. He attributes first place

to the economiC beeauS8 throup the years the British commercial iDterests were
already tastiag through olaadestiae trade, somethiDg of the riche. of the commerce
of Buenos Aires; aafI ia 1809 ae farmer's of Buenos Aires Joined the commeroial

interests by addressfJII a oommunioattoa to the viceroy, C!_eros, abotat free trade
with the British as a mea:u of alleviatlag the poverty of the people lad earlohiag
the colonial treasury. He reprds Rousseau's Sootal Contract, QQ.esaay's General
Maxim. of Polltloal Eecmomy. and Condillac's Treatte. on the Seuatiou as the
ideological souroe of the Revolution of May.
The emphasis .. the assertion of a&tural rights by the creole leaders
involved assiIBiag a major role to the political ideas of the Ealightenmeat as a
major cause of the May revolt. The writings of MODteaquleu, Voltaire, and
Rousseau were hailed to be at the root, for from what other source could the notion
have reached BueDOS Aires that man was born free, that he had natural rights, and
that governments not based on popular CODSeIlt were tyraImous.

:1
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Of late there has been a new emphasis on the importanoe of the

political theories of the seventeenth-oentury Jesuit writer Francisco Sua.rez for
the thought of the revolutionary generation in Spanish America. There is a persistence in the effect of the traditional doctrines of Spanish scholasticism. especially the doctrine of popular soverelgnty, despite the fact that Guinaztt in his
~

Eplfwa de la Libertad. in speaking of the Revolution of May 25, 1810, asked:

"Dmlde est&. el pueblo 1"
Probably, the chief influence of the political ideas of the Enligb,tenment ill Buenos Aires before 1810. was to encourage reasonable and effie1ent administration which caused the creole leaders headed by Belgrano to take a public
spirited iDterest in the improvement of their goverament. However, the patriots
in Buenos Aires were usually too busy with economiC protests, too greatly handicapped by empty treasuries, and too much concerned with outwittiq royalist
officials, to do much more than dissemillate propagaada and maintain themselves
precariously.
III the first place we

S88

merely the contiDUiitIon of the idea that the

government should develop economiC resources, make piau to improve agriculture
and industry, stimulate economic activity; and, of course, OpeD the port of Buenos

Aires to commerce. The study of ecoRomic conditions in Buenos Aires in the
immediately pre-revolutionary period shows the conflicting illterests of the monopoUstic merchant and craft guilds with the creole merchants, plantation owners,
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and stockmen, and the way in which they were affected by colonial laws and administratlve practices.
One of the first matters that cODcerned me was that correlation, If
any, existed between the craft guilds and the factors working toward the Revolution
of May. A scrutiny of the acuerdos of the cabildo of Buenos Aires casts little light
Upoll

the activities ad tllfluenoe of the lUnda in pre-revolutionary Buenos Aires.
First, there were very few artlS&1l8 in Buenos Aires before 1810.

The carpenters, .hoemakers, silversmiths, tailors, blacksmiths, and others, were
mostly foretlllers from Italy, Germany, Flaaders. aad Englllld, who were so vital
to the colOllY that royal decrees ordering the expulsiOll of foretpers from Buenos

Aires would read:

"De todos los extrllljeros que habiten

ell

ella asf solteros como

casados; y ~J1~ndo de la obligaciOn de esta Ciudad ateader al bien y utUtdad pUblica
de

8U

veclndad Y teldeado preseDte la ley declma, llbro 19, titulo Z7 de las

Recopiladas de Jadtas en que se ordena que la expq!sicin de los extranJeros, que
resideD en estu Iadlas, no se antiendan en cwmto a los que sirven ofiolO8 mecaaicos
. • • como

80Jl

herreros, zapateros, sutres, oarplDteros, calafates. abaines, . .

." When the royal order of 1'748, for example, did not specify the exemptions, the
oabtldo Judged it necessary for the well-being aad usefulness of the city of Buenos
Aires that the artisans should be exoluded.
Second, at the end of the colonial period when the num her of arttsans
aad workshops increased as the restrictions imposed by Spain were lifted, saavedra
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acting as syndic of the cablldo of Buenos Aires was reluctant to register new guilds.
The shoemakers formed a guUd in 1788 but had trouble from the start because they
refused the foreign IU'ld colored shoemaker. the right to govern. The argument was
sttll raglngln 1796 when the foreign IU'ld oolored .hoemakers WIU'lted to register
their own lU11d. Finally, in a report in 1799, Saavedra ruled that the guilds far
from being useful IU'ld necessary were prejudic1al to the general welfare because
they weaken the rights of men, inorease the milery of the poor, hinder industry.
are opposed by the people, IU'ld cause mlU'ly other inoollveniences. He opposed the

1Ui1. in the name of the right to work and added that this rtlht tl the most sacred
an.d Inviolable right of man. The oahUdo agreed with Saavedra and tried to lnfiuence

Sobremonte, the one viceroy lilted as takin.g an avid intere.t in increaling the number of IUUds.

1,11

Fourth. BelJl'llllO." I"tereateclla promoUng tDdutry ODd mODll-

facturing but wanted the trades fostered by the oonsulado, which would give young
men opportunities to visit European countries to learn from experts. He joined
Saavedra In oppoSing the formation and registration of lUnda.
Levene adds, "El formidable alegato de Saavedra hirio de muerte
a los gremios, y antes de que se prociuJera 1& revoluci6ll habflU'l desapareeido &un
los InteDtos de au constituct6n." 3
3

Levene, Ensalo Hl.tOrico. I, 448.
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What conclusions are to be drawn from this? Attempts at guild
organization in Buenos Aires and even in the entire La Plata had been frustrated

I,
i'l
'II

at first by Spain and later by the creole leaders in the conaulado and the cabildo.
It is quite obvious that they would have little power and influence on the factors

]iI'
I

III
IIII

working toward the Revolation of May 25, 1810.
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In his discussion of the internal cauaes of the Revolution of May,

I

il

l

I"I',

Levene deftnes an eooaomic cause as the condition of richness and commerce in
the colony as a result of the prevailing regime. During the years of Spanish
dominatton there took place on the one hand, active movements of the monopollstic
merchants for the purpose of obtaining COIl.Istoas ad lpecial privileges; and on
the other hand, movements of the landowners, laborers, and creole merchants
who pleaded for the free exportation of products. The documents of the seventeenth
century are characterized by opposition to the monopolistic economic poUcy of
Peru; and at the end of the eighteenth century, after the promulption of the regulatlOilI concerning free commerce between Spain and the Indes in 1778, the Iltruggle il interpreted in Buenos Aires as one of opposing interests agalut the
monopolistic cUque of Spanish merchants. Gonzalez phrases it luccinctly: "Como
el moaopol1o comercial impl8Dtado por la MetropoU sipificaba la esencta misma
de todo el sistema colonial; 1& tinioa alteraatlva era la independeacia del imperio
espaDol. "
4:

..

Gonzllez, p. 169.
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Disposal of surplus goods disturbed the creole merchants in Buenos
Aires. Freer trade was needed, and North America assisted the commerce of
BIt.".,_ Aires at the time. Amenaan ahlps earrled aD oommeree for the BlteJlOS

Aires merchant Tomas Antonio Romero to Rio de Janeiro, HaVl.D&, Africa. Romero

was a member of the important

Bue~os

Aires junta of 1809, which assembled to

discuss the proposal for the relaxation of trade. Stores of products from wharves
in Buenos Aires were transported by New York, Boston, Salem, and Philadelphia
ships from 1'798 to 1810. The records of the Buenos Aires cabUdo and couulado
indicate the cltsm9Y of the merchants, while American customs house records and
shipping lists point to the begiDDings of inter-American trade. 5
Our kDowledp of British economiC Interests in :&lenos Aires
and of British economiC penetration, at a time when new Uno were beinl forged
&ad new interests created between Buenos Aires and the outside world, causes us
to usess her role in the internal economic causes of the Revolution of May. We

need to consider the revolution which the English invuiou of 1806-180'7 instilled
in the minds of the people of Buenos Aires. Although deserted by thet r ruler,
the coloniats of BuellOs Aires had driven out a forelp enemy. Havtnllong exhibited
an apathy and an indifference to their fate, they 81IddenJy became conSCious of their
Owll

strength. A pol1tical transformation had oCOIIrred. Some creoles were made
5
Bernstein, pp. 40-42.
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to see the possibilities of independelloe, and as soon as this passion for freedom
should be diffused, the revolution wowd begin. But the Napoleonic blockade had

cut Buenos Aires from European markets. gd the resultant practical economic
problems were more important to the people than matters of natural rights, popular sovereiJDty. gd the progress of man.

,;,,1'I'

More taaglble reswts of the English invasions, moreover, and
effects more likely to be of greater consequellces were the awakening of an American
class aad the impulse toward action. From the time of the British invasions there
arose two definite cluses which persisted in an everwtdentDi PoP to the eve of the
revolution tn 1810: the creoles, who ceDtereel arowad the popular leaders: and the
peninsulars, who supported the cabildo.
It seemed almost contradictory to the general trend of this study
that in this grouping of the people of Buenos Aires Into creoles gd Spaniards,
Mariano Moreno should stand with the Spaaish. or at least, opposed to the creoles.
Historlaaslive two explaaations for this attitude; first, he frowaed on the plus to
set up an independent coutitutfoul monarchy under Carlota; second. he disliked
the ideas aad goverament of Liniers, whom he suspeoted of Loyalty to Napoleon.
Although Moreno had some oOlUleetton with the popular movement
iupired by Belgraao, it was not until September 1809, that he was drawa lso the
public lpotlight. Followillg the expulsion of the Eqlish. the cost of nece.sary artioles had risen extremely high; farmers and oattlemen had no markets for their
:,

'"I!!
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pro<uce; the public treasury was empty; and all classes but the smugglers and
monopolists were suffering. It was as defender of the people that MorellO pleaded
for the opening of Buenos Aires to British goods, &ad the free exportation of the
frutos del pals.

The RepresentaeiOn not only had iDtrillsic value; but for the fi rat

time, the name of Moreno was linked with the great eommereial crisis tn Buenos
Aires. His logic was that of a fiery polittcian pleadin, for a great national cause.
I agree

\111.

th Diego Molinari that the importance of the

Repreaeataci. has very llkely been exaggerated, but it had at the opportune
moment a high economic and political slp.ificance. Hia cry for the intervention
of the people in the government aDd

m economic questions was revolutionary in

origin and. plned wide popularity. In addition to that, its appearance sip.ifted
,

a change in the career of Moreno, whose four years of ailenee on revolutionary
ideas had flnally come to an _d.
But whUe OIl the one hand, the Revolution of May was plaoed very
firmly in a general commercial setting, on the other, it was closely related to the

1/
II

developtnglife within Buenos Aires. There was evidence of a powerful patriotic
society utilizing the power of the preas, the riae of criollismo, and the alow un-

III
I'

,

jll

folding of a "Conciencla de Sf." This aspect of the revolution manifests itself in
the lives of Belgrano anel Moreno, whose biographical studies cmtribute to a more
systematic examhlatlOD of creole ideas, and to a clearer understanding of local
economic and revolutionary foraes in Buenos Aires.

III
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A compelling economic force caused the Revolution of May 25, 1810
at Buenos Aires, which resulted in the deposition of the viceroy. the establishment
of a junta signaling the transfer of power from a Spanish to a oreole minority. and
the attempt to carry the revolution into the interior provinces. A compelling economio force would also be necessary to bring the provinces together under Buenos
Airea.
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